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In this project, I aim to integrate the ethics of care into the doctor-patient 
relationship.1 Contemporary medical ethics do well to limit harm to patients. However, 
they are defined mainly in the negative — as rights of the patient that must not be 
breached — and lack a positive dimension of responsibility towards one’s patient. In 
many cases, doctors are sacrificing a relationship founded on trust that could open 
avenues for more empathy and better clinical outcomes. I think the ethics of care can 
complement the principlist ethics currently dominant in medicine by emphasizing a 
moral orientation grounded in caring, including values such as attentiveness and 
receptivity to the other. This mirrors the way that ethics of care scholars such as Held 
incorporate rights into the private space and responsibilities into the public. Through 
integrating the ethics of care and associated values, we can build a stronger foundation 
on which to rest the patient-doctor dyad. 
  
                                                        
1 “Physician” and “doctor” are used interchangeably throughout the paper, although the latter is generally 






I would like to thank my advising team for walking me through this process. My 
primary thesis advisor Dr. Caroline Lundquist — known to her students simply as Dr. 
L. — has been a major source of support throughout my writing process, guiding me 
with weekly meetings and feedback throughout the writing of this paper. In my 
secondary reader Dr. Bonnie Mann’s feminism class, I learned the foundations for much 
of the work in the ethics of care that I engage in here. And I saw my writing abilities 
drastically improve in my Honors College Advisor Dr. Gallagher’s ethnobotany class, 
giving me the academic confidence to be able to surmount such a large writing project. I 
also want to thank my own mother, Allison, and father Ric for modeling care for me so 
beautifully in our home. Finally, I would like to thank my grandma Gloria, who passed 
away earlier this year and was a paragon of care in my family, and an excellent and 





Table of Contents 
I. Introduction 1 
II. Existing Medical Ethics and How They Came to Be 6 
a. The Origins of Medical Ethics 7 
b. The Peak of Paternalism 8 
c. Modern Medical Ethics 9 
III. Obstacles to the Doctor-patient Relationship 11 
a. The Overreach of Autonomy 11 
b. Paternalism 16 
c. Physician as Scientist 17 
d. Professionalization 20 
e. Economics 22 
IV. Repercussions of a Faulty Relationship 26 
a. Repercussions for Doctors 27 
b. Repercussions for Patients 31 
V. Situating the Doctor-patient Relationship Within the Ethics of Care Literature 35 
a. What is the Ethics of Care? 36 
b. Developing Care 40 
c. Fitting the Ethics of Care Into Medicine 43 
d. One Way of Actualizing Ethics of Care: Narrative Medicine 46 
VI. What does an Ideal Doctor-patient Relationship Look Like? 48 
a. Listening 50 
b. Empathy 53 
c. Responsibility 58 
VII. Potential Shortcomings of an Ethics of Care in Medicine 61 
a. Economics 62 
b. Sexism in Medicine 64 
c. Caring Isn’t the Doctor’s Job 67 
d. Simplicity 69 








In times of illness, we are forced to confront a fact that we often shove aside: 
though we may feel fully self-sufficient as we move through our day-to-day lives, we 
are one mishap away from being rendered powerless and dependent on the care of 
others, just as we all were as children and most of us will be in our old age. The 
relationship between a doctor and patient is complex, as it must balance an inherently 
unequal power dynamic, allowing for the patient to act without coercion, and yet leave 
room for a relation of trust and empathy to be built between the two. This last point is 
key, as contemporary medical ethics can have an overreliance on the letter but not the 
spirit of caring for one’s patient. In this paper, we will examine the doctor-patient 
relationship and see how we can open avenues for more care within the relationship, 
while working alongside existing principles of medical ethics. To this end, this project 
will fall within the school of the ethics of care, a branch of feminist ethics that focuses 
on maintaining relationships rather than making detached judgements about what is 
most fair, and that is flexible to contingencies rather than being locked into absolute 
principles. 
This project will not merely stay within philosophy, but also supplement 
biomedical ethics, and hopefully inspire changes in how medical ethics are taught and 
put into practice. Also, this construct of a well-functioning doctor-patient relationship is 
not just an ideal, but something I’ve seen in practice by multiple physicians. I plan to 
attend medical school and become a physician in the future. Because of this, over the 
past few years, I have spent several months shadowing a couple of excellent physicians. 




they related to their patients; I saw warmth, familiarity, and care in their practice - they 
were treating their patients as friends in need. This made it all the more confusing when, 
in the ethics classes I took here at UO, I found out how ethics are taught to doctors. 
Here, what was stressed was not the warmth and empathy I’d seen, but cut-and-dry 
principles to apply rigidly to medical cases. This concerned me, because it seemed like 
the good medical practice I’d seen was not being codified. 
The way that medical ethics are taught to undergraduates at Oregon is indicative 
of a larger trend in how medical students in schools around the country are taught. The 
field of medical education is dominated by a single ethical perspective, known as 
principlism, or relying on a set of codified principles to sort out medical dilemmas. Two 
of the most influential authors in medical ethics, Thomas Beauchamp and James 
Childress, express this perspective most coherently. These authors base their work 
around upholding the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
respect for persons. Their work in ethics is by far the most well-known by medical 
students. In a survey of the ethics curriculum of all medical schools in the US, 
researchers found that Beauchamp and Childress were the most-taught authors, and 
other highly-taught authors relied on their same principlism method of ethics (Dubois 
and Burkemper 2002). As clinician and OHSU medical school educator Paul Qualtere-
Burcher says, of the 3rd and 4th-year students he taught seminars to — who had already 
received their lectures on medical ethics in the first two years — he “never encountered 
a medical student who knew any methodology for deliberating on medical ethical issues 
other than the principalist theory put forth by Beauchamp and Childress” (Qualtere-




Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism did not evolve in a vacuum. Their ethics 
emerged in response to historical abuses of power by physicians, to which Beauchamp 
and Childress specifically designed their principle of respect for patient autonomy to 
address. However, in their current state, both autonomy and paternalism are 
impediments to a caring doctor-patient relationship. What’s more, we will go on to see 
that these two apparently dichotomous orientations are actually two sides of the same 
coin. In a caring doctor-patient relationship, the doctor is responsible for the patient, but 
they use that responsibility to further the patient’s particular goals for their health. 
These principlist ethics also align conveniently with another role that has been 
growing in power in medicine: that of the physician-scientist. As Alfred Tauber, MD, 
explains, physicians used to be defined primarily by their role as healers, but that 
changed rapidly throughout the 20th century (Tauber 1999, 10-12). Scientists are taught 
to relate to objects, not other subjects, and what’s more, they learn to relate in an aloof 
and objective way (Tauber 1999, 13). These skills may serve them well in the lab, but 
patients do not want dispassionate, removed doctors. They want doctors that can 
recognize and connect with what they’re feeling. According to a 2005 survey of over 
10,000 patients of different socioeconomic statuses, 76% said that empathy was “very 
important” to their current clinical consultation (Mercer et al., 2005).2 And by several 
metrics, this need is not being met. Multiple studies show a decrease in empathy in 
medical students throughout their clinical years, when they first learn how to interact 
with patients (Hojat et al. 2009, Chen et al. 2007). Authors such as Public Health 
                                                        
2 Empathy here was based around the CARE (Clinical and Relational Empathy) measure, and was defined 
as: “ the ability to communicate an understanding of a patient's world and to act on that understanding in 




Scholar Rebecca Garden suspect this might be due to students being overwhelmed with 
work, disidentifying with patients, or being made to develop an “emotional crust” in 
response to an abusive work environment (Marcus, ER, and Braynard MH, as cited in 
Garden 2008). 
This project will be relatively unique in medical ethics in that it advocates what 
medical ethics scholar and M.D. William Branch calls a “moral orientation.” That is to 
say, it balances moral sensitivity, motivation, and character, rather than just following 
set-in-stone ethical codes (Branch 2000). In this way, this project adds to the greater 
project within humanistic medical ethics of equipping doctors with a holistic way to 
approach patients. Rather than drawing rigid divides between doctor and patient as 
current medical ethics tend to do, we will look at the gestalt of the doctor-patient 
relationship itself and how to strengthen that. Because we are bridging conventional and 
new approaches to medical ethics, we will have a unique vantage-point to both reflect 
on the strengths of the doctor-patient relationship as it stands and prescribe ways for it 
to become even stronger. 
There is a lack of diversity within medical ethics education, and so ethical 
theories that make up for the deficits of medical principlism are valuable in the field. 
This paper can add another outlook to the discourse within medical ethics. Furthermore, 
it has been established that this search for a new ethics within medicine responds to a 
genuine need that patients are asking for. To establish this new ethics, there is no need 
to tear down the existing project of ethics that has done good work to get us to where 
we are. Instead, we can build a new ethics of care within medicine alongside the 




particular needs and vulnerabilities, building trust with them without having to trample 
over their boundaries. 
In chapter II we will review existing medical ethics and see how they came to 
be, setting up a groundwork for positive work built on the strengths and weaknesses of 
historical medical ethics. In chapter III we will go over some of the main obstacles to 
the doctor-patient relationship: the overreach of the principle of patient autonomy, 
paternalism, the doctor’s role as scientist, physician professionalization, and the 
economics of US healthcare. In chapter IV we will examine the causes and 
repercussions of the current lack of empathy in medicine. In chapter V we will 
summarize the ethics of care and discuss how it can have a positive influence on 
medicine. In chapter VI we will outline a vision of the doctor-patient relationship in the 
positive, building on the critiques offered in chapter III. Finally, in chapter VII we will 
review and address various perceived objections to this project, and chapter VIII will 




II. Existing Medical Ethics and How They Came to Be 
The practice of medicine used to be a straightforward ordeal. Patients would 
come to a doctor in need of medical treatment, the doctor would tell them what to do, 
and they would do it, no questions asked. Since the doctor had the knowledge, they 
called the shots. This model, now known as physician paternalism, meant the doctor 
made treatment decisions without consulting their patients or even fully explaining what 
they were doing. Until the mid-20th century, this was widely considered acceptable for 
physicians, as people either totally trusted their physicians’ judgements, or just didn’t 
have the power to put up a fight. 
However, over the last century, the ethics governing the doctor-patient 
relationship have changed greatly and rapidly. After witnessing several high-profile 
cases of physicians deceiving their patients for their own ends, the public demanded 
more accountability and power in the medical treatment process. The field of bioethics 
emerged, and settled upon a guiding principle that was completely out of discussion in 
the days of paternalism. In his book, The Birth of Bioethics, Albert Jonsen says that “as 
bioethics began, then, the notion that was to become its hallmark, respect for autonomy, 
was rare in the philosophical air” (Jonsen 334). The notion that patients should be able 
to make decisions about their own healthcare, called patient autonomy, went from 
unheard-of to becoming the governing principle of medical ethics. Thus, a field that was 
once dominated by the power of doctors was taken by storm by informed consent and 




a. The Origins of Medical Ethics 
Alfred Tauber, MD, recounts the origin of medical ethics in America in his 2005 
book, Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility. When the first formulations of 
medical ethics emerged, it was understood that patients were to follow their doctor's 
directives submissively. In the AMA’s (American Medical Association) first code of 
medical ethics in 1847, there was no suggestion of the notions of consent or a patient’s 
right to determine medical treatment that have become widespread today. A popular 
medical ethics view of the day argued that by withholding information from their 
patients, physicians could actually build public trust (Tauber 2005, 72).  
To get a sense of how bad things were, we can look at the writing of Dr. Richard 
C. Cabot. Cabot practiced in the early 20th century, and advocated for actually 
informing patients of their conditions and how he would treat them, as well as 
addressing the personal and social needs of the patient. This approach was considered 
radical for his time. However, even humanists such as Cabot only went so far as to 
advocate for doctors explaining patients’ conditions and treatments to them, never 
actually letting patients participate in the treatment decision-making process (Tauber 
2005, 74). This paternalism stayed popular until as late as 1955, when supreme court 
cases such as Hunt v. Bradshaw regarded consent and patient disclosure as legally 
unnecessary (Tauber 2005, 75). It took until the 1970s for physician paternalism to 
definitively come to an end. 
What is so ironic about this history of paternalism is the background in which it 
unfolded. The first formulations of medical ethics arose into a milieu of individualism, 




didn’t occur to physicians to grant personal authority to their patients. As Tauber 
explains, this thread continued throughout the history of medicine, where medicine has 
generally been behind the curve in adopting the modern views of the self. First, 
medicine was late to even adopt the notion of the rational, atomized individual that had 
already become so entrenched in other disciplines such as economics and politics. Then, 
by the late time that medicine did adopt this conception, those fields had already moved 
on to begin to recognize the individual through their social dimensions (Tauber 2003, as 
cited in Qualtere-Burcher 2011, 49-50). Medicine’s status as a late adopter of 
understandings of self – autonomous or not -- helps to explain the precarious balancing 
act of this project between responsibility on the part of the doctor and independence on 
the part of the patient. 
b. The Peak of Paternalism 
It took a series of grievous medical atrocities for paternalism to finally receive 
its due self-scrutiny from the medical community. Paul Qualtere-Burcher3 writes on the 
more recent consequences of physician paternalism in his dissertation, Re-thinking the 
Patient-doctor Relationship. The peak of paternalism — and thus, public scrutiny in 
response — occurred in the mid-20th century. This is when authoritarian biomedical 
research resulted in some of the most egregious atrocities of modern medical history, 
including the Tuskegee Syphilis study and the Seattle “God Committee.” In the former, 
during an experiment from 1932-72, African American men were knowingly withheld 
treatment to their syphilis when it was developed in the midst of the experiment. The 
researchers justifying their choice by saying that that the patients were: “clinical 
                                                        




material, not sick people” (Tuskegee 2011, as cited in Qualtere-Burcher 2011, 15). In 
the “God Committee,” when determining the allocation of the first dialysis machines in 
the 1960s, physicians discriminated along categories such as married vs. single and 
churchgoing vs. atheist, effectively dooming certain groups to death based on their own 
partial values (Qualtere-Burcher 2011, 14-15). Both these incidents rightfully created 
large skepticism in the medical establishment, and a change was in order for medical 
ethics. 
The nail in the coffin was the 1975 In Re Quinlan case. In this landmark legal 
case, the parents of a persistent vegetative patient named Karen Quinlan wanted to cut 
off her life support, but physicians managing the case disagreed. In the end, the parents 
went to the New Jersey supreme court and won the case. According to Social Medicine 
Professor David Rothman, this case: 
announces and promotes a fundamental shift in the doctor-patient, or 
hospital-patient relationship… if one had to choose just one document to 
represent the triumph of the autonomy movement, that document would 
be a court decision, and it would be the Quinlan decision. (Rothman 
2001, as cited in Tauber 2005, 76-77) 
By this time, a large public pressure had built up against physician paternalism, with 
patients rightfully indignant that they had no say in medical decisions about their own 
bodies. Thus, by this point the foundations for modern medical ethics were laid. 
c. Modern Medical Ethics 
Ultimately, the medical community at large began to cave to the pressure after 
these 20th century cases. They came together and formed the first generation of modern 
medical ethics as we know them. Patient autonomy rose up to take the place of 




orientation towards their patients. The principle of respect for autonomy was soon 
thereafter formalized as informed consent laws by state. In 1979, Beauchamp and 
Childress published their first edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, and began to 
promote a new set of ethics that championed patient autonomy among other values of 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and respect for persons (Beauchamp and Childress 
1979). This gets us to today, where these principles have long dominated the field of 
medicine, and as stated, are the most popular to educate doctors. 
While Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles are supposedly equal, in 
practice, autonomy takes precedence over the others. As medical ethicist Ranaan 
Gillion says, respect for autonomy is “primus inter pares — first among equals — 
among the four principles” (Ranaan Gillion 2003, as cited by Kekewich 2013, 22). This 
makes sense given the history behind them, and the goal these principles were 
developed for: fighting paternalism. For example, when the principles of autonomy and 
beneficence butt heads in medical case studies, beneficence is usually framed as the 
physician doing what they think is best for the patient without the patient’s 
consent/knowledge. In other words, beneficence takes the role of a paternalism that 
medicine has just broken with and does not want anything to do with, so autonomy is 
propped up as the better alternative. However, just because autonomy arose to defend 
against the deceit of paternalism does not mean that it should be free from criticism. On 




III. Obstacles to the Doctor-patient Relationship 
Now that we have reviewed the historical necessity of patient autonomy, we can 
begin to examine its problematic aspects. In this chapter, we will review several 
obstacles impeding a caring doctor-patient relationship. We will start with autonomy, as 
it has been most examined in the literature. Then, in the chapter that follows, we will 
examine the empirical repercussions of these obstacles for doctors and patients alike. 
a. The Overreach of Autonomy 
Autonomy interferes with a trusting doctor-patient relationship in several ways, 
and for medical ethics to keep advancing, it must go beyond solely focusing on patient 
autonomy as a guiding star. The issue with a patient-autonomy-centric view of ethics is 
that while patient autonomy does prevent paternalism, it does not in itself create 
closeness, and can in fact be a barrier to that closeness. As a practicing physician and 
medical educator, Qualtere-Burcher has experienced this:  
It is certainly not impossible for physicians to respect patient autonomy 
while maintaining close, supportive relationships with patients at the 
same time. The two are not logically exclusive, but in practice, 
physicians often seem to jump from ‘respect autonomy’ to ‘hands off the 
patient’—in the sense of providing support or expressing empathy. 
(Qualtere-Burcher 2011, 51) 
Henceforth, let us refer to this extreme doctor-patient relationship style ‘hands-off 
autonomy,’ where doctors take the principle of respect for patient autonomy as a 
synonym for emotional detachment and an excuse not to make a connection with the 
patient. Throughout this project, we will come to outline the full path through which 




with their patients. For now, suffice it to say that this ‘hands-off autonomy’ is one of the 
biggest impediments to the caring doctor-patient relationship we will come up against. 
Qualtere-Burcher argues that in hands-off autonomy, doctors often rely on a 
facts-values delineation wherein they bring the facts to the patient, and the patient 
provides their personal values, and thus the medical decision is made (Qualtere-Burcher 
2011, 62). This seems logical, given that doctors know more about medical facts and 
patients more about their own lives. However, medical “facts” often also presuppose 
values, and things quicky go off-script when doctors acknowledge this. Qualtere-
Burcher gives the example of “pointing out the contradiction between, for example, 
desiring long life and a pack-a-day habit of smoking cigarettes” (Qualtere-Burcher 66-
67). Clearly, there are values present behind the medical advice to reduce smoking, i.e. 
living a longer life, but they are such inoffensive values that it make sense to bring them 
into the equation. Therefore, it makes sense for physicians to make such a case. 
We will come to see that this delineation of ‘facts from the doctor, decisions 
from the patient’ is just a way for doctors to shirk from having to do the real work of 
critically thinking through the patient’s case and prescribing the best course of action 
for that patient, all things considered. Thus, hands-off autonomy is seductive for 
physicians, because they have an opportunity to abdicate responsibility by placing 
medical decisions and their consequences in the hands of the patients. Such a view is 
quite different from a relationship based on trust and responsibility on the part of the 
physician that we will come to outline. 
Tauber compiles similar reasons for why the rise of patient autonomy has 




informed consent have come to serve as “rituals of trust [that] have emerged as 
substitutes for organic trust” (Tauber 1999, as cited in Tauber 2005, 59). However, 
these rituals can only provisionally replace actual trust, indicating a need for trust in the 
relationship that we will go on to attempt to meet. Secondly, citing Renée Fox, Tauber 
argues that it is in the best interest of neoliberal governments and for-profit health-
insurance systems to be able to slot the relationship between patient and doctor into the 
model of “consumer” and “provider” neatly (Fox 1994, as cited in Tauber 2005, 60). 
Finally, patient autonomy is, at its strongest, still only a negative right. That is, 
patients only have the power to refuse treatments, not demand treatments. “Physicians 
are translators and filterers of information to their patients, who generally defer to 
physician recommendations regarding definitions of disease and its treatment” (Wolpe 
1998, as cited in Tauber 2005, 60). Really, the way in which the physician frames the 
patient’s illness and their treatment options necessarily limits the many possible 
applications of medicine to their case, simply because of the vast difference in 
knowledge between the two. If doctors really don’t think a particular treatment is called 
for, they can refuse to provide service to a patient.  
This leads to another problem with the formulation and practice of the principle 
of autonomy: just saying the patient is on equal footing with the doctor doesn’t make it 
so. Physicians were taught to stop being paternalistic, but that doesn’t mean that the 
power-dynamic at work in the doctor-patient dyad was simply eliminated. Because 
when the dyad comes together, they do come from quite different places: the patient 
comes at a vulnerable time, plagued by illness, while the physician has trained for years 




in many caring relationships. But relationships in medicine are particularly 
characterized by this knowledge difference because one person has sought out the other 
just because they know how much the other’s knowledge can help them.  
In his piece, “Market Liberalism in Health Care: A Dysfunctional View of 
Respecting ‘Consumer’ Autonomy,” medical ethicist Michael Kekewich argues that 
patient autonomy in its current formulation is dysfunctional because the physician has 
to rely on some form of paternalism for a meaningfully therapeutic relationship 
(Kekewich 2013). Kekewich goes on to argue that some form of patient autonomy is 
clearly necessary, but there is room to fit it into a mosaic of ethics rather than having it 
as a monolith to which all other ideas about how a doctor ought to interact with their 
patient are subservient. 
Finally, beyond a critique on the emphasis on autonomy in medical practice, 
there is a critique to be leveled at the very notion of autonomy. Care ethicists such as 
Virginia Held specifically critique the “autonomy… of the self-sufficient, atomistic self 
that can be distilled, uncharitably, from traditional liberal theory” (Held 48). We were 
born into relationships, dependent on parents to meet our material needs, as well as 
crafting an initial social identity for us. Then, as we go through life, that identity 
morphs, somewhat due to our volition, but also largely due to the socially-defined roles 
we hold: jobs, romantic partners, friends, civic engagements, hobbies, etc. For medicine 
to overwrite this and say that the two halves of the doctor-patient relationship are fully 
independent and need nothing from one another is unproductive. In chapter five we will 
expand on these critiques from care ethicists, and see how we might restructure 




Furthermore, much is sacrificed when we idolize the autonomous self at the 
expense of the social self. As Tauber puts it: “the idealized autonomous person forfeits 
trust, friendship, loyalty, caring, and responsibility as secondary attributes to those 
primary values of self-direction, self-determination, and self-realization” (Tauber 2005, 
118). Clearly, those former values are important in the practice of medicine as well. 
Doctors who can cultivate responsibility, trust, and friendship will be much more 
successful at reaching out and caring for their patients, rather than turning medicine into 
a disengaged transfer of knowledge that could just as easily occur with a computer 
interface. 
This is not to say that care ethicists believe we are incapable of making 
autonomous decisions. Rather, as Held explains it, “The autonomy sought within the 
ethics of care is a capacity to reshape and cultivate new relations, not to ever more 
closely resemble the unencumbered abstract rational self of liberal and moral theories” 
(Held 14). Medicine needs to catch up to other fields, where a social understanding of 
the self has long eclipsed a purely autonomous and independent one. The way forwards 
is not through doing away with autonomy, but rather through giving it a place alongside 
other important values such as care and responsibility. 
Beauchamp and Childress address many of these complaints in the newer 
editions of their medical ethics textbooks. Against critiques that autonomy can put 
undue burdens on patients, they respond that the capacity for medical decision-making 
is a right, not a duty (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 105-07). They defend autonomy 
against critiques of being overly rational and individualistic by saying that autonomy is 




Childress 2009, 100). Furthermore, they are pessimistic about the input of doctors into 
their patients’ healthcare decisions. They found that although 93% of patients believed 
they were benefiting from extra information their doctors told them, only 12% actually 
utilized that info (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 123). 
Yet Beauchamp and Childress don’t fully address these critiques, either, only 
devoting a brief two pages to cataloging the concerns of care ethicists on medical ethics, 
and not responding to those concerns directly (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 36-38). 
That is where this project comes in. We will not only outline how the ethics of care 
could be put to use by medicine, but also ways in which the field of medical ethics 
could be driven to a more productive place through integration of humanistic concerns 
with existing (and strong) medical ethics principles. 
b. Paternalism 
 Given the thorough critique of autonomy above, one might assume that this 
paper advocates a return to physician paternalism, as existed before the principle of 
respect for patient autonomy took hold. This is not the case. Medicine certainly does not 
need a regression to paternalism, but there are traces of paternalism in the principle of 
respect for autonomy, only under a different guise. 
 For our purposes, paternalism in the doctor-patient relationship will be defined 
as the doctor not explaining what they’re doing to the patient, deceiving them, or not 
letting them in on the decision-making process. Paternalism is motivated by an 
assumption that the physician knows better what’s best for the patient, and knows what 
the patient wants more than the patient does themselves. Paternalism interferes with the 




street between the doctor and the patient. Regardless of the fact that the patient is ill and 
needs care, that care cannot be administered sensitively nor justly if the patient is 
excluded. Inefficacy arises when doctors prescribe certain treatments without asking 
about their patient’s preferences or values. In doing so, doctors can also miss crucial 
information necessary to make medical decisions. 
c. Physician as Scientist 
 Paternalism and autonomy are not the only things getting in the way of a caring 
doctor-patient relationship, however. Another factor is the role into which physicians 
are categorized and trained. While intensive changes were happening to the field of 
medical ethics during the 20th century, the role of the doctor was also shifting. As 
Alfred Tauber explains in his book, Confessions of a Medicine Man, the responsibility 
of a physician used to be primarily towards healing their particular patients, and 
building trust with them through humanistic means. However, with the widespread 
integration of science and technology into medicine in the early 20th century, that 
responsibility has merged into a responsibility towards science at large. Doctors were 
forced to morph from physician-healers to physician-scientists. Some of the leading 
physicians of the time, such as Francis Peabody (1881-1927), warned against these 
intrusions by science into the formerly humanistic field of medicine: “One of the 
essential qualities of the clinician is interest in humanity, for the secret of the care of the 
patient is in caring for the patient” (Tauber 1999, 16). Dr. Peabody recognized the 
positive potential that science could bring to medicine today, but also wanted to 




just from a certain scientific level of analysis. Unfortunately, he was on the losing side 
of history. 
 Nowadays, physicians are primarily scientists as undergraduates before they 
make the transition to medical school. Just a glance at the required courses for 
prospective doctors shows a heavy emphasis on the basic sciences of chemistry, 
biology, and physics, with few if any requirements in the humanities. This primacy on 
science prepares pre-medical students to take a reductionist approach to healing, 
focusing more on the science than the patient.  
After undergraduate education is complete, this trend continues. Tauber argues 
that far more weight is given in the medical field to the research one publishes than to 
the care they give to their patients, or to their capacities as a medical educator: “The 
rewards in our medical schools do not traditionally go to the teacher or the committed 
clinician, but rather to the competitive clinician-scientist” (Tauber 1999, 21). Treating 
the patient humanistically has been side-lined to make room for the physician’s 
individual growth and pursuit of scientific and research ideals. Medicine has paid the 
price, though. Science was one of the factors in medicine’s fall from grace in the public 
eye throughout the 20th century. As ethicist Jonsen puts it: “the scientific training of 
which modern medicine was so proud seemed to transform the healer into the 
technician who was remote, difficult to see, and even more difficult to understand” 
(Jonsen 12). Clearly, the primacy of science is not helping an already-strained 
relationship between medicine and the public. 
This reaches back to the “rituals of trust” of consent paperwork that Tauber 




science in medicine coincided with the jump from paternalism to autonomy. Just as 
doctors were coming to rely more and more on technical means to apply to their 
patients’ bodies, they received a mandate that could be interpreted as saying that getting 
involved with the patient’s emotional and personal life was out-of-bounds. Thus, while 
doctors had just gotten the opportunity to pivot to a more inclusive decision-making 
style than paternalism ever offered, they instead chose to retreat behind the shield of 
scientific objectivity. That scientific approach to medicine might protect doctors, but it 
also sidelines other important components of care, including developing relationships 
with patients. 
 The very premise of physician-as-scientist comes with baggage that can get in 
the way of the doctor-patient relationship. Scientists are taught to relate to their test 
subjects in very particular ways. They are the “subject,” and the patients are “objects” 
who are to be observed with a dispassionate clinical technique. The subject-object 
relationship in science is based on a primacy of division, so that the scientific observer 
might stand apart and take their object of study objectively (Tauber 1999, 13). Whether 
or not this type of dispassionate style can be attained in science, it certainly should not 
be a goal of medicine. Doctors who feel they have to separate themselves from their 
patients in order to more objectively observe the illness at a distance will leave their 
patients stranded to struggle with the illness on their own. This can lead to a cool, aloof 
interaction style that is far from the model of engaged care we are working towards. The 
language of “subject” and “object” matters - in viewing themselves as the “subjects” 
doctors can come not only to see themselves as apart from their patients, but also see 




decisions. We can read this as another case in which autonomy only runs surface-deep, 
and can disguise doctors’ views of patients as inferior. 
More generally, the physician’s role as scientist may lead to a dismissive 
attitude towards medical ethics, that they are the tedious precautions that must be 
checked off before the real heavy lifting of science-based-medicine can be undergone. 
They are the parallel of safety protocols that must be followed in the science laboratory, 
as translated to the clinic with human patients. Tauber argues that the care side of ethics 
in particular is set up as an obstacle to the physician’s true objective: applying science 
to malfunctioning bodies. 
A prevalent rationale for relegating these moral and emotional 
dimensions of care to a peripheral role is the vacuous claim that 
addressing the subjective dimension of the patient putatively distracts 
from the true agenda of the clinician, namely, her application of 
technical virtuosity and scientific competence. (Tauber 2005, 48) 
Tauber goes on to argue that this view sets up a false dichotomy, and in reality both the 
humanist and scientific sides are clearly necessary to the practice of modern medicine 
(Tauber 2005, 48). Science’s techniques and raw power definitely aid medicine, but 
they must be applied through a humanistic style of care, or else doctors risk further 
estranging their patients. 
d. Professionalization 
 Alongside the doctor’s new role of scientist has come the role of provider. Thus, 
“providers” – even the language is molded towards an economic essence rather than a 
social role -- have taken on a larger burden of professionalization into their roles. In my 
own experience working as a caregiver, I was explicitly informed to refer to the people I 




the professionalization process is supposedly to better serve the patient, it can end up 
negatively impacting the authentic care they can display towards their patients, and the 
genuine connection that can be built between the two of them. If doctors feel pressured 
to become something they’re not, to put on a face in order to sell themselves and their 
treatments as a product, it will inhibit trust and connection with their patients. How can 
you trust someone who is only trying to sell you on something? 
In many ways this mirrors the discussion above on how respecting a patient's 
autonomy can easily become a justification for limited emotional interaction with the 
patient in practice. That being said, there is a place for emotions in the clinical 
encounter, and there is a place to withhold them for the sake of the patient. Ethical case 
studies can help us to delineate between the positives of demonstrating emotional 
resonance for the patient and the negatives of being overly affected by the patient’s 
conditions, to the point where they cannot look to the physician for guidance.  
 In their article, “Professionalism and Appropriate Expression of Empathy When 
Breaking Bad News,” Amy Blair MD and Katherine Wasson PhD utilize a case study to 
determine the ideal balance between being professional and expressing one’s emotions 
and building connections with patients. In the case study, a young medical student is 
assigned a patient. At first, the patient doesn’t open up to her and feels standoffish. 
After finding common ground with the patient, however, the patient opens right up to 
the student and they end their interaction on a happy note. Later that week, the medical 
student has to break bad news about a cancerous mass to the patient. When she does so, 
the patient is shocked and begins to cry. The medical student cries in return, and reaches 




who never saw her build the initial connection with the patient — reprimands her for 
how she interacted:  
It’s all right to feel sympathy for patients, but you crossed a line there. 
Crying can detract attention from the patient, and some patients do not 
like to be touched. It’s natural to want to help patients, but you need to 
learn to channel that energy into being a good practitioner and leave the 
more personal comforting to family and friends… As you see more and 
more, you won’t feel the emotions as much. (Blair and Wasson) 
The authors don’t have a simple metric to determine which doctor is in the right, but 
they do warn that “learning and maintaining professional boundaries can easily turn into 
learning and maintaining detachment, which can further be rewarded when detachment 
is perceived to be synonymous with rationality and clinical objectivity” (Blair and 
Wasson), a fear that we have begun to unravel in the last several sections. 
This article points to a general tension between professionalism and empathy in 
the doctor-patient relationship. As with the other obstacles to the doctor-patient 
relationship, there is not a simple resolution here. There is definitely a point at which 
the physician’s emotional expression can be too much, and this case study pushes on 
that boundary. However, many doctors like the attending in this story have simply been 
conditioned to believe that anything is too much, and that they should totally withhold 
emotional connections with patients. Ultimately, doctors shouldn’t withhold their 
emotions out of fear for the potential losses to their practice or professional demeanor, 
but only if it is appropriate for the care of the patient.  
e. Economics 
While it will not be the main focus of this paper, one cannot touch upon any 
aspect of healthcare in the United States without acknowledging the economic disparity 




hard for a doctor to build a relationship based on a caring orientation when they’re 
limited by the sheer amount of time they’re spending with their patients, or when a 
patient has to choose between taking prescriptions and paying their rent. What makes 
this particularly hard is that physicians often take the fall for the systemic inadequacies 
of the market to deliver affordable care. 
As MD Susan Dorr Goold explains in her article, “The Doctor-Patient 
Relationship: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies,” doctors take the toll when 
health care insurance providers over-promise care options. Because of competition to 
enroll patients, health-care network negotiators promise to cure every single ache and 
pain the patient has. In reality, they have far from comprehensive service, but the 
negotiator only puts the limitations of the network in the fine print of the contract with 
the patient’s employer. Then, “Primary care doctors thus become the bearers of the bad 
news, and are seen as closing gates to the patient's wishes and needs. When this 
happens, an immediate and enduring barrier to a trust-based patient-doctor relationship 
is created” (Dorr Goold 1999). While individual physicians do not have many options at 
their disposal for providing certain methods of care to patients with limited insurance, 
they still take the blame, and thus impersonal economic failures of the for-profit 
healthcare system put strain on the personal doctor-patient relationship. 
This project, however, is more focused on the ethical component that individual 
doctors can integrate into their practice to improve their personal relations with patients. 
Even if medical care were accessible to all Americans, there would still be a need for 
medical ethics, and the problems we’ve discussed above would not go away overnight. 




their doctors, as evidenced by the fact that “complaints of friction between doctors and 
their patients were in abundance well before the rise of HMOs … [so] the problems 
arising from a disparity in power between doctor and patient cannot be reduced to a new 
corporate mentality” (Balint 1964; Katz 1984; Brody 1992, as cited in Tauber 2005, 
81). That being said, there is a clear need for a health-care system in America that is 
free at the point of service, and such a program would make it far easier for physicians 
to put forth the effort to build engaged doctor-patient relationships. 
 
In conjunction, we see the barriers towards strong doctor-patient relationships 
compiling to strain trust and entrench inequities. Through these negative descriptions, 
we can begin to see what it is we might be looking for in a doctor-patient relationship. 
A good place to start is to find the ideal level of engagement with the patient through a 
Goldilocks approach; between paternalism and hands-off autonomy, is there room for a 
balanced third option of engaged care? One author, Bioethicist Julien Savulescu helps 
to delineate between three such styles in his article, “Rational Non-Interventional 
Paternalism: Why Doctors Ought to Make Judgments of What is Best for their 
Patients.” Savulescu argues that the problem with paternalism is not only that it blocks 
patients from sharing personal values that could shift the case, but also that it lets the 
doctor choose a treatment plan without having to justify it to a patient who could check 
the doctor’s reasoning and hold them accountable. Anti-paternalistic ways of interacting 
with the patient, on the other hand, let the patient engage with the doctor's ideas and 




 This is where hands-off autonomy fails. When confronted with the prospect of 
having to actually choose a method of treatment, based on a delicate interplay of 
medical facts with the values of a patient's life, the hands-off autonomists throw up their 
hands and walk away from the case, leaving the patients to integrate the facts into their 
life on their own. In many ways, these hands-off doctors mirror the hardline paternalists 
who didn’t let their patients get involved with decision-making, as in both cases the 
physicians refuse to take responsibility for a plan of action and be held accountable if it 
fails. This is the easy way out. As Savulescu says: “It is easy to turn decision-making 
over to patients and say: ‘There are the facts - you decide’ ” (Savulescu 331). The 
alternative is for the doctor to actually take the medical facts, learn about the patient’s 
life, and then recommend a plan of action. This is easier said than done: “It is difficult 
to find all the relevant facts, to form evaluative judgments, and critically examine them. 
It is even more difficult to engage a patient in rational argument and convince him that 
you are right” (Savalescu 331). While it may be difficult, in doing so, doctors transcend 
the paternalism-autonomy binary and progress towards actually caring for their patients 
in an engaged, vulnerable way. As long as there is a failsafe in place where the patient 
ultimately makes the decision, there is room for the doctor to make a partial case for a 
certain line of medical treatment that merges their medical knowledge with the patient’s 
goals for their life. This approach begins to remedy several of the issues we have seen 





IV. Repercussions of a Faulty Relationship  
The repercussions of these obstacles to the doctor-patient relationship have been 
devastating. Empirical studies help us to understand the urgent need for a doctor-patient 
relationship of engaged care. We can start by examining the foundations of the doctor-
patient relationship, in medical school. Medical students enter the profession filled with 
a surplus of empathy and sympathy, ready to care for their patients as best they can. 
However, as they come to adopt the role of detached clinician rather than caring doctor, 
their emotional resources are strained and can even be pushed to a breaking point. As 
illustrated by a 2009 study conducted by Hojat et al., we see a decline in empathy 
throughout the four years of medical school (Hojat et al., 2009), and burnout among 
doctors in their later careers continues to increase (Kane, Medscape 2020). This decline 
in empathy calls for an explicit integration of empathy into medical ethics, something 
we will cover in the following chapters as we outline our ethics project. 
Patients also suffer the consequences of disengaged care. They are not satisfied 
with the role that compassion and empathy are relegated to in medical practice, and feel 
like their doctors can’t answer their questions or serve as a source of guidance for them. 
Changing the focus to the priorities patients ask for from their doctors paints a very 
different picture of an ideal doctor than what the patient-autonomy-centric model of 
care tries to mold doctors into. Yet this new model is far more reflective of the needs of 
the cared-for. Here, we shall examine the repercussions of a poor doctor-patient 




a. Repercussions for Doctors 
We would hope that medical schools would teach budding doctors not only the 
technical competencies of medicine, but also how to relate to patients and ease them in 
their times of suffering. At the very least, we would expect that such traits would be 
unaffected by education, and thus remain unchanged throughout medical school. 
However, empirical data shows that after medical students transition from their first two 
years in the classroom to the later two years in the clinic, they actually become more 
withdrawn from their patients, scoring lower on empathy assessments compared to their 
prior scores (Hojat et. al). This decline in empathy is ripe for examination in light of the 
underlying causes of disconnection in medicine studied above. 
There is originally a surplus of empathy in those who choose to become doctors. 
Medical students enter school “enthusiastic, filled with idealism and a genuine intention 
to serve those in need of help” (Hojat et. al). For many, this is what motivates them to 
pursue medicine in the first place. However, by their later years, almost three-quarters 
of medical students have become cynical about the medical profession (Hojat et. al). 
Hojat et. al conducted a study of empathy levels in medical students across their four 
years of medical school, and discussed their findings in the article, “The Devil’s in the 
Third Year: A Longitudinal Study of Erosion of Empathy in Medical School.” They 
found that empathy4 significantly decreased in the third year5 of school, when students 
transition from the classroom to the clinic. 
                                                        
4 The researchers used a survey called the Jefferson Scale for Physician Empathy, which asks participants 
to give ratings based on how much they agree with statements like “Because people are different, it is 
difficult to see things from patients’ perspectives” (negatively rated). 
5 The researchers found that their scores did not change at all from before the beginning of the first 
through the end of their second year. However, after that the scores steeply declined for both cohorts 




The researchers offer a number of reasons to explain this precipitous drop in 
empathy. Their main hypothesis is that modern medical education: 
promotes physicians’ emotional detachment, affective distance, and 
clinical neutrality as emphasized through a focus on the science of 
medicine and a benign neglect of the art of patient care. Students can 
easily misinterpret these lessons as an endorsement of avoiding 
interpersonal engagement in patient care. (Hojat et. al) 
As a medical student put it: “we are always being reminded to keep a professional 
distance, but some doctors take it too far” (Hojat et. al). Another prevalent response was 
that the sheer pressure of the increasing productivity of the hospital left students without 
the energy or time to invest in their patients. One student said: “it is hard to care 100% 
about some patients’ stories when you are tired and have a ton of people to see” (Hojat 
et. al). We can’t definitively claim that detachment or intense patient burdens are behind 
this drop in empathy, but they seem likely culprits given the negative effects of such 
detached styles we theorized in the last chapter. 
These are not isolated factors. Physicians do not just happen to both have a 
hands-off style and be overworked to the bone. In truth, these pressures on the young 
physicians are what cause them to resort to the hands-off autonomy style referred to 
above. This helps to explain the origins of the detached relational style introduced 
earlier. Physicians are not forgoing relationships, rather, because they are under so 
much economic pressure, they resort to a detached style as a protective measure for 
themselves. This switch is most clear in young physicians just entering medical school. 
They enter with a surplus of empathy, but when put through the meat grinder of 
mechanized hospital interactions, they see how much harder things are than they 




just don’t get as engaged in your patients' lives, you’ll not only be protecting yourself, 
but you’ll also be upholding the almighty principle of patient autonomy. 
This decrease in empathy might work for medical students for the time being, 
but down the line they suffer the consequences of this transition to a more detached 
style of care. One of the largest such consequences of a faulty doctor-patient 
relationship for doctors is physician burnout. Harvard Psychiatrist and Director of 
Empathy Research Helen Riess says that burnout describes what happens when 
physicians become so detached from their patients that they no longer see them as 
people.  
Burnout is defined when a few things are happening, called 
depersonalization, where patients are seen more [like] a number, or a 
diagnosis, or on a list instead of like real people. [Also,] a sense of 
decreased effectiveness, just feeling like no matter how hard I work I just 
don’t really feel like I’m doing a good job. And emotional exhaustion. 
(Craiglow 31:41 - 32:06) 
This problem of doctors not really seeing or listening to their patients is something that 
we are attempting to resolve with this new project of engaged care. The National 
Academy of Medicine published a report last year estimating the rate of burnout to be 
between 40 and 54 percent, double the rate of workers in other fields (Craiglow 32:07 - 
32:20). While some blame with burnout lies with overbearing supervisors and a 
preponderance of menial responsibilities at work, these high numbers of burnt-out 
doctors also point to a disengaged approach by doctors to their patient’s care.  
However, as Riess explains, it is not physicians’ fault that they are experiencing 
such higher rates of burnout: 
It’s not to blame the doctors. I just think that our system right now is 
working to get the outcome that we’re seeing. First of all, medicine has 




patients and to really form relationships, it’s much more about 
throughput now, and how many people you can squeeze into an 
afternoon. The incentives are much higher to see somebody for 20 
minutes to just prescribe their medicine than to see them as a whole 
person. (Craiglow 31:03 - 31:33) 
Clearly, the economic pressures of a corporate health-care system and the abilities of 
individual physicians to form emotionally close relationships with their patients are 
intimately linked. Under such intense pressure to increase their output of patients 
treated — note the word choice of “treated” rather than “healed,” as is common in the 
medical literature — it is no wonder they revert to the mechanics of medicine rather 
than building personal connections with those they are attempting to heal. 
There is a vicious cycle at work here. When first exposed to the medical field, 
young medical students are overwhelmed by the number of patients they must see in so 
little time. If they practice in a way that upholds the reasons they came into medicine in 
the first place, they risk over-exerting themselves emotionally. Besides, they don’t have 
the time. So instead, they employ emotional detachment to protect themselves from the 
burdens of a hefty patient-load and emotional overexertion. However, this strategy 
becomes self-destructive, as the attempts to cut off emotional harm instead end up 
furthering that harm in the form of physician burnout. 
This narrative of burnout fits right alongside the pressures on doctors to conceal 
their emotions and withhold connection from patients discussed above. There is almost 
an incentive to follow the disengaged model of care implicit in the ubiquity of the 
principle of respect for patient autonomy. Multiple factors align - scientism, 
professionalism, autonomy, and a simple desire not to get harmed by being too close to 
patients. In sum, these lead to a doctor-patient relationship that is removed and 




really happening in medicine as a whole, in large part due to increasing corporatization 
and output pressures. 
b. Repercussions for Patients 
When doctors provide distant and disengaged care, their patients suffer. Surveys 
on patient preferences paint a stark contrast with the conventional goals of physicians. 
A 2004 poll of 2,267 patients asked which attributes they valued from their doctors. The 
top five most-valued-traits were: “Treats you with dignity and respect,” (85%) “Listens 
carefully to your health care concerns and questions,” (84%) “Is easy to talk to,” (84%) 
“Takes your concerns seriously,” (83%) and “Truly cares about you and your health” 
(81%). Clearly, what is emphasized here is a more engaged and caring approach to the 
healing process and the doctor-patient dyad. It is not until we get to the patient’s 12th 
and 14th priorities — “Has a lot of experience treating patients with your medical 
condition,” (58%) and “Could get you admitted to a leading hospital when you need it,” 
(55%) respectively — that we see more of the traditional objectives of medicine. 
Second from last on the list is “Has been trained in one of the best medical schools” 
(27%), which is ironic given how much prestige is typically associated with medical 
school among the medical community (Bright for the Wall Street Journal 2004). This 
aligns with other research into patient preferences, such as the cross-culture desire for 
empathy cited in the introduction (Mercer et al., 2005). 
These demands are unique and stand in contrast to the problems facing the 
doctor-patient relationship. Patients are not calling for more scientific competence to 
resolve their health-care matters. They want support and engaged listening from their 




doctors’ shortcomings, as that is what care is all about: meeting the needs of the other. 
This attentiveness to the other is true respect for patient autonomy, as we will go on to 
discuss - autonomy is listening to patients when they ask for more than a barebones 
clinical encounter.  
A particularly telling response is the call for “true care” from physicians. As the 
medical community slowly becomes cognizant of the need to strengthen interpersonal 
relationships, it has proposed some band aid solutions to the care deficit. These 
solutions generally fall in the same vein as offering up patient autonomy to resolve 
physician paternalism, without fully recognizing the failings of that solution. Some in 
the medical care literature suggest that compassion-based care is an “easy switch.”  For 
example, the authors of Compassionomics: The Revolutionary Scientific Evidence that 
Caring Makes a Difference, argue that doctors can respond to appeals like these with 
the simple addition of a few more questions to the dialogue protocol with their patients, 
that will take under a minute more time, and actually save money for hospitals because 
of stronger patient outcomes (Cheney 2020).  
However, such responses do not actually address the patients’ appeals. 
Technical solutions like this totally miss the point of what patients want, in a way that 
reflects the historical disregard for patient preferences on the part of the medical 
community. These patients are not simply asking for surface-level politeness in their 
medical care. The variety and depth of their wishes demonstrates that they expect 
intimate connection and trust from their doctors, much like the engaged care model that 
we’ve begun to outline. While it may be true that compassion and care do save hospitals 




rightful mistrust of the medical establishment, and if physicians act caring for the mere 
sake of not having to deal with their patient as much in the future, the patients will be 
able to sniff out the inauthenticity. Physicians can’t fake these attributes, nor can they 
simply be externalized and added to another checklist as part of the many menial 
responsibilities clinicians must take up that contribute to burnout. Doctors actually have 
to internally cultivate care for their patients, and when they do, these external pieces 
will fall into place. 
Individual patients’ stories are also an important indicator that there is 
something missing in the existing relationship with their doctors. In the piece, “I Like to 
be an Informed Person But…” Sinding et al. conduct a series of qualitative interviews 
with patients suffering from breast cancer. The patients come from high levels of 
education, and throughout their treatment process they are presented with materials that 
encourage them to “educate themselves” on their illness. However, as treatment 
advances, many of them do not want to deal with the constant responsibility of having 
to learn bulk medical knowledge and make weighty calls. So they turn to their 
physicians for guidance. Yet they find their doctors surprisingly trepidatious to give 
tailored advice, or even their personal opinions. Some patients are reduced to the point 
of having to resort to semantic trickery to extract real advice from their physicians:  
“If it is your choice what would you do?” [no answer]. 
“What would you do?” [No answer]. 
“Medically, what’s the better choice” 
“My opinion is the more tissue I can remove, the better the risk.” 
(Sinding 1098)  
Patients are communicated a message that, to stave off illness, they must educate 




negative effects of their treatment choices, and even ultimately culpability for illness 
recurrence. It is better to have the physicians take responsibility for the illness, while 
honoring the patients’ autonomy. They learn about the patient’s life, offer up a set of 
choices, with their recommendation for one choice, but have the patient makes the 
ultimate call. 
  
In sum, these measures provide empirical evidence for the concerns previously 
raised about the state of the doctor-patient relationship. Young prospective doctors enter 
medical school driven by empathy and care for their future patients, but in their very 
first year of exposure to patients, overwhelmed by the pressure of medical timetables, 
they resort to a coping strategy of emotional detachment taught to them by older 
residents. However, later in their careers, they suffer the consequences of this form of 
detachment in the form of burnout. Meanwhile, patients suffer from this reservedness in 
the form of lack of connection with their physicians. As the picture begins to come 
together, we see the urgent need for engaged care.  
We have mainly summarized what the doctor-patient relationship ought not look 
like, with little discussion of a positive vision for this dyad. There are plenty of 
criticisms about doctors already, but what is rarer and more valuable are methods for 
doctors to improve the care and connections they have with their patients. Thus, in the 
chapters that follow we will outline a positive view of how the doctor-patient 





V. Situating the Doctor-patient Relationship Within the Ethics of Care 
Literature 
 So far, we have observed that because of the way medical ethics evolved in 
response to abuses of physician power, there is an implicit mistrust in the doctor-patient 
relationship. Safeguards to protect against this mistrust do their job, but also can 
interfere with building a closer relationship between doctors and their patients. That is 
why the new style of physician-patient relationship advocated here is grounded in 
values of trust, empathy, receptivity, and responsibility. Thankfully, we do not have to 
create such a model from scratch. Ethical scholars have determined that such a style of 
relationship has long been present in feminine relational styles and can have vast 
repercussions if it is taken as a foundational good for society. These scholars represent 
the ethical school known as the ethics of care, which can guide the doctor-patient 
relationship in ways that promote flourishing, trust, and greater emotional connection 
between the two. The ethics of care is uniquely suited to answer the lack of a relational 
ethics in medicine, as scholars have often used it to refute liberal, autonomy-based 
models of ethics in other fields that mirror Beauchamp and Childress’ principles of 
biomedical ethics. 
Care ethics scholars argue that certain types of dependent relationships are 
ubiquitous and unavoidable. Those can include infancy, severe physical and cognitive 
disabilities, and old age, all which have received their due study in the ethics of care 
literature. Illness, however, while it can be fully debilitating and leave a person in need 
of the care of medical personnel, has not been studied as much in the care ethics 




rather than physicians, e.g. Chris Gastmans’ work such as the 1999 article, “Care as a 
Moral Attitude in Nursing” (Gastmans 1999). While it is true that physicians do not 
experience the same stigmatized and under-compensated conditions that other care-
givers do, they can still stand to benefit from the positive formulations of the ethics of 
care. Here, we will examine the reason for that lack of research, and attempt to broaden 
the ethics of care discourse by determining how physicians can integrate the ethics of 
care into their practice. We will use the views of several ethics of care scholars to stand 
in for the discipline as a whole, in order to begin to introduce how the ethics of care 
could be actualized in medicine. In the chapter that follows we will refine and outline 
certain values particularly relevant to medical practice: intensive listening, empathy, 
and responsibility. 
a. What is the Ethics of Care? 
Care ethics is a diverse and evolving movement, so it is hard to encapsulate it 
from a single lens. One of the most comprehensive overviews of the ethics of care is 
Virginia Held’s The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. In this text, Held 
applies the ethics of care to a broad set of domains. She also searches for an ethical 
system that can encompass both justice — rights, principles, and independence from 
others — and care — relationships and responsibilities to others. She rejects the notion 
of care for the private sphere, justice for the public, and instead sees the need for each in 
both domains; those in private abusive relationships certainly need justice, and 
institutions outside of the home like businesses have a responsibility towards the 
environment and the citizenry (Held 69). This project will carry this inquiry over into 




coercion and upholding patients’ rights. But what is underrepresented in the body of 
medical ethics is the need for care in clinical relationships. In this project, we will see 
why and how the moral orientation of care can be utilized by physicians to strengthen 
their relationships with their patients and provide better treatment.  
A note to remember when working with the ethics of care is that in Held’s 
words, they are ethics, not merely unbridled care: as such, they can help us prevent 
against cases “when excessive empathy with others leads to a wrongful degree of self-
denial or when benevolent concern crosses over into controlling domination” (Held 11). 
This well help us provide structure in responding to some of the tough questions we 
have already encountered of paternalism and overbearing empathy. 
I will also integrate several other texts by scholars of the ethics of care in order 
to ensure that this project is supported by a survey of views within the field, rather than 
solely those of an individual author. To that end, we will work with Joan Tronto’s 
Moral Boundaries, which examines the political implications of an ethics of care. We 
will include Eva Kittay’s Love’s Labor, which contains a vision of care that is more 
based around what Kittay calls “dependency work” and determine whether there is 
room for professionals to utilize care within Kittay’s framework. Finally, we will look 
at Michael Slote’s The Ethics of Care and Empathy, which integrates the virtue of 
empathy into the caring relationship. 
The ethics of care holds quite different views from the general ethical canon. 
Traditional schools of ethics have insisted that people make ethical choices as 
individuals, free from the fetters of their connections to others. As Hobbes put it, men 




there are able to enter into neutral social contracts as individuals (Hobbes 1966, as cited 
in Kittay 23). Care ethicists have a different view: care, and human life, starts and ends 
with dependency. As Kittay says, “The independent individual is always a fictive 
creation of those men sufficiently privileged to shift the concern for dependence onto 
others” (Kittay 17). For care ethicists, an understanding of morality is always rooted in 
our relationships to particular others in our lives, rather than starting with a pretext of a 
totally isolated, autonomous actor making impartial moral choices. Because women 
have been historically relegated to roles of care, men have often been able to get by 
ignorant of the care they are so dependent on, and have thus embraced these 
individualist ethics despite their actual interdependence. 
The ethics of care has some important roots in the work in the 1982 book, In A 
Different Voice, by psychologist Carol Gilligan. Gilligan was studying moral 
development and noted that boys and girls had different perspectives and priorities 
when presented with ethical scenarios. While previous research had merely 
characterized girls as “less developed” than their male counterparts, Gilligan recognized 
that they were actually following wholly different prerogatives than boys. Masculine 
ethical development was tied to independence, rights, and disconnection from others, 
but feminine was tied more to responsibility, relationships, and caring for others 
(Gilligan 1982, chapter one). These two perspectives have since broadly come to be 
known as the “voice of justice” and a “voice of care” (Norlock 2019).  
Joan Tronto argues that there are three main criteria from which to differentiate 
these voices. She says that,  
the ethic of care revolves around different moral concepts than 




than rights and rules. Second, this morality is tied to concrete 
circumstances rather than being formal and abstract. Third, this morality 
is best expressed not as a set of principles but as an activity, the ‘activity 
of care.’ (Tronto 78) 
Later discussion has contested this binary of care and justice. Some care ethicists, like 
Nel Noddings, have argued for the superiority of a care perspective (Held 63). Others, 
such as Held, have made the case that both care and justice are valuable, but care is 
more foundational to societies in that society can continue without justice but will not 
last longer than a single generation without care (Held 17). Regardless of the exact 
formulation, ethics of care scholars do argue for at least some degree of care alongside 
justice. Held says that, “I am more inclined to say that an adequate, comprehensive 
moral theory will have to include the insights of both the ethics of care and the ethics of 
justice” (Held 16). In medical principlism, however, care has fully taken a backseat to 
justice. 
While Gilligan’s work laid the foundations for an ethics of care, Gilligan 
focused more on a criticism of existing ethics rather than a positive vision of a new 
school of ethics. Such a vision came soon after in Nel Noddings’ 1984 text, Caring, 
which explicitly outlined a positive vision of caring. As Slote summarizes Noddings’s 
work, “An action is morally permissible, and even good, if it exhibits caring on the part 
of its agent… Actions, on the other hand, that display indifference or malice toward 
(relevant) others count, ethically, as wrong or bad” (Slote 10). This evaluative 
component of care ethics is particularly important for this project because we do not 
want to just describe what existing doctors are doing well, but rather build a new school 




Finally, as stated in chapter three, care ethicists are generally critical of the 
notion of full autonomy, paralleling the rejection of the monolithic principle of respect 
for patient autonomy that we embark on in this project. Held rejects autonomy in favor 
of what she calls mutual autonomy, a collaborative process between the carer and cared-
for that negotiates the interests of both: 
Mutual autonomy is very different from what traditional autonomy 
would be, if there were such a thing. Traditionally, autonomy has been 
understood in terms of self-sufficiency, noninterference, self-direction, 
rational control, and the like… Holding up liberal ideals of self-
sufficiency masks these facts of dependency and interdependence, and 
distorts the realities of, among other things, caring labor. (Held 55) 
Once again, we see that deifying autonomy is not a value-neutral decision, there are 
other values lost when autonomy is the guiding principle of our ethics. Clearly, while 
there is room to maneuver the principle of autonomy in medicine into a new more 
relational definition, it cannot continue to exist in its current formulation. Furthermore, 
if we are able to actually establish such a relational form of autonomy, then it could be 
able to enable care, rather than serve as an obstacle against it. 
b. Developing Care 
The ethics of care emerged from feminine thinking, but it is important to 
recognize that its insights are not limited to women, nor specifically to women who are 
relegated to roles of care because of systemic inequality. In Held’s view, somebody 
who learned how to care through their choice, and not because they were forced into it, 
would have more of an appropriate motive:  
The goal of being a caring person can certainly and should be a matter of 
autonomous choice. A person who has merely unthinkingly and 
uncritically followed the caring practices into which she has been 




appropriate motive of consciously and reflectively recognizing the value 
of care. (Held 49) 
Doctors therefore have the potential to take up values of care even if they were not 
socialized into it, so long as they have the appropriate motives and effort. 
That being said, we are not beyond history. Because the patriarchy has had so 
much sway over gender relations, many women are still relegated to roles of care to this 
day. While this fact is sometimes framed as a reason that women need to break free 
from the caring mindset in order to free themselves from oppressive power structures, it 
could also be taken as a call to action for men to take up the value of care in equal 
measure. If we recognize care as a valuable trait, and separate it from the inequitable 
gender delegation it has long been associated with, then the onus falls on men to learn 
care, not on women to disavow it. 
This brings us to an important point in understanding the ethics of care. While 
the ethics of care stems from feminist traditions, it is unique in that tradition in that it 
goes beyond simply advocating for equality or elimination of the patriarchy or 
domination of women, and instead champions a positive view of ethics based on 
womens’ hard-won experience of having to be responsible for so much of the care work 
of society. This has driven some authors to differentiate the ethics of care as “feminine” 
rather than “feminist.” In their book, Culturally Relevant Decision-Making in 
Counseling, therapy ethicists Felicia Wilczenski, Rick Houser, and MaryAnna Ham 
explain that, “ ‘Feminine’ ” refers to a search for women’s unique voice and advocates 
for an ethic of care. ‘Feminist’ refers to an argument against male domination and 




framing of these ethics, but also maintain the possibility for others to adopt them as 
well. 
In his book, Slote outlines several ways that all can begin to embrace care. He 
says that:  
The overall difference in empathic tendencies between men and women 
might be due largely to differences in the way men and women have 
been raised, socialized, or educated. If empathy is primarily shaped by 
practices of child-rearing and socialization, then different practices could 
lead to men becoming much more empathic than they are, on the whole, 
nowadays. In particular, if we adopted a care-ethical approach to our 
social practices and institutions, we could encourage/educate everyone to 
be emphatically caring in relation to others, and male displays of 
emotion, nurturing, and altruism generally wouldn’t be devalued or 
looked down on (by males) in the way they tend to be at present. (Slote 
72) 
 
This is a culture change that will take more time than is possible to teach to one 
generation of doctors. Yet change can be made in the near future by bringing care ethics 
into the medical school curriculum and into the practice of doctors. Furthermore, if 
Slote’s predictions about the differences in levels of practice of care between the 
genders is accurate, then we would expect to see different interaction styles between 
male and female doctors, and that is indeed what we see. 
Multiple studies corroborate that patients who are attended to by women have 
lower mortalities than those attended to by men. In sum, if there were only women 
doctors in the United States, 32,000 fewer patients would die each year (Tsugawa 2017, 
as cited in Alspach 2018). Researchers have explained this greater efficacy of treatment 
through some of the very same values emphasized by an ethics of care: “Patient-
centered communication (including patients as partners in care and sharing some 




offering encouragement and reassurance),” and simply spending “More time with 
patients” (Alspach 2018). It’s hard to say the exact reason for this difference in patient 
outcomes, but these values are indicative of the type of care we are discussing here. 
 Tronto, however, would be critical of such findings and their potential to point 
towards gender essentialism. Tronto argues that early care ethicists’ work like 
Gilligan’s dove-tails too nicely with “positive” stereotypes about women as: “less 
criminal, more nurturing, less likely to tell lies, and so forth” (Tronto 85). But these 
beliefs can clearly be harmful in that they relegate women to certain roles in society 
regardless of their desires: “It is still difficult to displace the notion that if women rather 
than men were involved in some spheres of live, then those spheres of live would 
change” (Tronto 85). We should keep these concerns in mind as we attempt to carve out 
a place in medicine for care ethics, making sure we do not simply reinforce stereotypes 
about women even if they are supposedly positive, as we run the risk of relegating the 
care labor within medicine to women doctors while men get off free, as has happened in 
so many other domains of society. 
c. Fitting the Ethics of Care Into Medicine 
One author, MD and internal medicinist William Branch, proposes various ways 
that medicine could enact an ethics of care. He argues that it boils down to changing 
medical ethics and medical education. In a study where he and colleagues analyzed over 
200 critical-incident reports by 3rd-year medical students, Branch argues that young 
medical students come into the field with blossoming receptivity — empathy and 
compassion — even more intense than everyday people. This must be why they have 




this empathy slowly beaten out of them, as they are assimilated to a ward culture with 
quite different values.  
Branch’s take on introducing care ethics to medicine hinges centrally on 
maintaining what he calls the therapeutic relationship (aka the patient-doctor 
relationship). Branch sees this relationship as crucial, because without it, doctors are left 
with the possibility of blowing through an encounter with a troublesome patient in the 
name of respect for autonomy, even allowing them to sign out against medical advice. 
The ethics of care presents an alternative to this scape-goat line of thinking through 
putting the responsibility for the good care, not merely care that respects autonomy, on 
the doctor’s shoulders: 
The ethics of caring tempers the application of the principle of autonomy 
by insisting that the physician seek a full and deep understanding of why 
the patient refuses treatment, and that he or she do this with sensitivity, 
attentiveness, honesty, and respect for the patient. The caring physician, 
while always respectful, also takes into account the patient as a 
vulnerable person, less knowledgeable than and dependent on his care 
providers. (Branch 2000, 129) 
Branch had students run through a routine education scenario wherein they meet a 
homeless and diabetic man who returned to the hospital after receiving antibiotics for an 
infected foot, which was now gangrenous and needed to be amputated. The patient 
clearly and repeatedly refuses amputation, essentially implying a will to death. Branch 
notes that while several of the students attempted to utilize principles of medical ethics, 
negotiating the tension between beneficence and autonomy in this case, none of them 
attempted to understand where the patient was coming from or build a rapport. 
However, when the students are instructed to shift their focus onto maintaining the 




such as starting with a therapy, with the future possibility of moving to an amputation if 
the patient doesn’t get better.  
Branch acknowledges a strikingly obvious, yet often unstated fact of medical 
care: doctors are always paternalistic to some degree. Because of their medical know-
how, they present a set of choices to patients that has already been tailored and scrubbed 
of options that they know are simply not medically advisable for the case. The construct 
of autonomy is applied retroactively, and to discrete decision-points in the care process, 
when in reality the treatment plan is a constant pruning of options on the medical side, 
as well as shifts between care providers (Branch 2000). 
Finally, the ethics of care challenges a core presupposition of the arrangement of 
medical practice: the divide between medical ethics and the actual doing of medicine. 
Right now, medical ethics domain deals with the moral questions of medicine, and 
medical practice deals with the rest in a supposedly value-neutral way. But the ethics of 
care, as a moral orientation, says that the entire domain of medical practice is subject to 
care, the moral value. Take, for example, the way that empathy is treated within 
medicine. Rather than being looked upon as a moral aspect of one’s character to 
cultivate in order to better relate to one’s patients, it is systematized and turned into 
another indicator of professionalism: “clinical empathy.” Care ethicists would be 
skeptical of this professionalist manner of approaching ethics. As Tronto says, 
The care perspective suggests a more integrative approach to questions 
of ethics in general and in professions as well. Professional ethics should 
be about more than teaching professionals that it is wrong to lie, to cheat, 
and to steal. The guiding thought that ethical questions occur in a context 
should centrally inform professional ethics. (Tronto 134) 
Care does not come divided neatly into different skills, but rather is developed as a 




d. One Way of Actualizing Ethics of Care: Narrative Medicine 
 While the ethics of care has a strong base in our intuitions and presents many 
compatibilities with our natural systems of ethics that other ethical theories do not, it 
does suffer some from the fact that it isn’t quite directly prescriptive as those other 
theories. Because care is a moral orientation, not a mere moral code, it involves not just 
moral reasoning but also the ability to recognize moral problems, the prioritization of 
those problems, and the moral character exhibited in following those problems to 
resolution (Branch 2000). It is impossible to become a caring person merely through 
study, such a transition must also be accompanied by actions. Thus, it can help to have 
codified traditions that help to express the ethics of care in ways that are tailored to the 
discipline one is working in.  
In our case, there is an emerging field with medicine known as “narrative 
medicine,” which involves physicians scrutinizing their patients’ histories as stories 
(Charon 2001). With attentiveness to small cues the patients and people around them 
give them off, as well as to traditional biometric measures, doctors can piece together 
the full story of the case. Narrative medicine builds empathy between the physician and 
the patient because it helps the physician know to some degree how the patient 
constructs the story of the illness in their mind, rather than merely the objective 
symptoms of the illness as noted in the textbook. As Charon says, “Along with 
scientific ability, physicians need the ability to listen to the narratives of the patient, 
grasp and honor their meanings, and be moved to act on the patient's behalf” (Charon 
2001). What does this illness mean to the patient? By the current model, the doctor 




wrong with them, rather than coming to the table with an open mind, ready to fix 
whatever arises.  
Narrative medicine says that we already naturally understand our lives as a set 
of stories, and illness is no different. Narrative is both how patients make sense of their 
illness, and how they share their potentially-isolating experience of illness with others 
(Charon 2001). If doctors can become more competent at piecing together the story of a 
patients’ illness, both diagnostically and biopsychosocially, they stand to build firmer 
connections with those patients. Furthermore, narrative medicine can provide a sort of 
structure as one begins to put caring practices into work in their medical practice. 
The existing medical ethics discourse is extensive and has benefited from input 
and growth for the better half of the last century. But there is room at the sidelines for a 
humanistic critique of the discipline, and it can naturally grow from this criticism. We 
don’t have to pull up the roots of the principlist method and build from scratch; there is 
clearly much value with the existing code, but there is room for yet more growth 
towards a paradigm that emphasizes values of care and empathy alongside maintaining 
moral and professional standards in clinicians’ work. Work by care ethicists can help 
physicians recognize their situatedness and interpersonal relationships, and become 
more attentive to the emotions of medical decision-making. What’s more, nothing in 
medicine will trump genuine care -- concern for one’s patient -- and obstacles to that 
care must be addressed by any medical ethics worth its salt. As renowned physician of 
his day William Peabody said, in response to the encroaching of scientific medicine 
upon the traditionally humanistic discipline: “The secret of the care for the patient is in 




VI. What does an Ideal Doctor-patient Relationship Look Like? 
While up until this point, this project has mainly focused on outlining the ways 
in which doctor-patient relationships go astray, from here we will focus on developing a 
positive image of this relationship. This model will be centered on empathetic, attentive, 
and engaged care to counteract the detached care that is so present in medicine. That is 
not to say that we will burn bridges with existing medical ethics; principlism can largely 
be salvaged so long as it is complemented by a set of humanistic values. Principlism 
even has several strengths such as simplicity and memorability that could be translated 
to a new relational model to make it function better. 
We will be paying particular attention to the demands of patients outlined in the 
last chapter, specifically the need for intimacy and true listening on the part of the 
physician. However, we can only call for so much on the part of individual physicians. 
Beyond this project, there is still the need for structural reform of the economic side of 
medicine such that physicians have time to interact with each of their patients long 
enough to build a connection, and so that patients can have affordable access to all 
medical products and services. When physicians are forced to meet heavy patient 
quotas, they are not able to devote their full resources to patients and their care. Thus, 
this chapter defines an ideal relationship that might not be achievable in many cases 
without systemic reform alongside it. However, this is also a strength of care ethics and 
this project. In some cases, medical principlism can function as merely a formula 
wherein the proper actions yield the ‘correct’ ethical result. The ethics of care, however, 





 Here, we will focus on outlining positive moral values rather than limitations on 
physician activity as are present in current medical ethics. Such values can be fostered, 
but will not be attained overnight and thus need dedicated institutional support 
throughout medical school. They can also be taken up and advocated for explicitly by 
individual physicians to their mentees, as well as simply put into practice by practicing 
doctors. One of the problems that we will grapple with, however, is that the simplicity 
of modern medical ethics makes it easier for physicians to remember and stick to them. 
Are we asking too much here from doctors by asking them to attain entirely new 
moral orientations? Perhaps not. Physicians are granted many benefits by society, 
including high salaries, prestige, and the privilege of having strangers open up about 
their most vulnerable aspects of their lives to them. Doctors are a guide to people in 
some of their most defenseless moments of their lives, as they pass through illness, 
health, and death. While doctors ought to share some traits with other caring 
professions, there are also immutable differences in status between medicine and fields 
like childcare, and social work, and those who are relegated to the domestic labor of 
care. It is reasonable to ask that physicians take up and hone these skills of relating to 
others, as well as taking responsibility for the charges they are assigned.  
In this section, we will review several values physicians ought to attain. These 
values come from an underlying respect for the patient as another person, and also a 
recognition for their dependency in this time of illness. By laying out this new 
perspective after providing a brief review of the ethics of care, we can attain a model of 





 The first tenet of this new doctor-patient relationship is receptivity to another. 
Doctors must be open to receiving the facts of the patient’s illness as well as the broader 
context of their life. This is not simply a matter of listening to what the patient has to 
say verbally, but also reading the cues of their body, attending to the patient’s friends 
and family who are helping them through their illness, and being receptive emotionally 
to how the patient feels about their ailment. Many times, patients are not explicit with 
how this ailment connects to the rest of their life, and they rely on doctors to connect the 
dots between the medical malady they are currently encountering and its broader 
significance for what gives their life meaning. Illness may be codified in medical 
textbooks, but the way it presents itself in patients varies. When we multiply this with 
the unique factors at play in the patient’s life, we see the need for a detailed and delicate 
care plan. 
Attentiveness is so important because the physician is often the only thread of 
concreteness linking a patient’s unstable and changing experience of illness to a 
powerful and secure body of medical practice. Sickness invites anxiety, and a doctor 
who hopes to calm their patient must be responsive to the patient’s many questions and 
concerns if they are to make the patient feel comfortable in this trying time. But 
medicine isn’t just about the illness and the insecurity around it. It’s also about wellness 
- the whole point of healing endeavors is to enable patients to again do what it is they 
love. In order to enable these avenues, physicians must open themselves to learning 




medical facts of the case, but also about the personal values at play in the patient’s life, 
if they are to resolve this particular illness for this particular patient. 
In many ways, attentiveness is already baked into the medical encounter. The 
doctor explicitly undergoes the recording of a history of the patient’s illness, but they 
can easily probe a little further, pay attention throughout this process, and let the patient 
know that they are heard. If a doctor knows what their patient enjoys doing, that might 
help them to reframe the recovery process as a return to a more enjoyable state of 
existence; there’s no need to segregate illness from the rest of a patient’s life. This can 
make a world of difference.  
This is not to say that doctors don’t currently listen to their patients — they 
clearly do on some level to achieve the level of healing that has been so praised by 
modern medicine — but there is also something left on the table. The problem of a lack 
of true listening originated with paternalists. Paternalism prioritized the physician’s 
perspective over the patients, to such a degree that the listening doctors did to patients 
was usually done in a patronizing fashion, not truly hearing what they had to say but 
instead just indulging what these doctors saw as child-like worry. Thus, doctors didn’t 
really think the patients were worthy participants in the medical decision-making 
process. This is not to say that paternalistic physicians weren’t genuinely sympathetic 
for the pain their patients were going through, just that while they might express 
genuine sympathy at their patient’s plight, they would not really deem a patient's 
contributions as worthy of factoring into their healing calculus. Thus, much valuable 
information about the patients lives that should’ve been factored into any medical 




A lack of listening is a significant problem in medicine, particularly when 
doctors assess womens’ health. Recent research and exposés such as Maya Dusenbury’s 
Doing Harm: The Truth About How Bad Medicine and Lazy Science Leave Women 
Dismissed, Misdiagnosed, and Sick show that women — particularly women of color — 
face severe discrimination by medical providers. Specifically, doctors often don’t 
believe women when they come in with complaints of pain or even serious illness. 
Rather than making the effort to hear what they are saying and seek out a diagnosis, 
doctors often just label the condition “medically unexplained symptoms” (Dusenbury 
78), and refuse to give them necessary tests or pain medication. Such problems result 
from a breakdown in listening on the part of the doctor. 
This breakdown in listening is likely related to the medical education process. 
Young medical students learn that it is easier to block out attentiveness to the emotions 
of their patients so that they can preserve themselves under such stressful conditions. As 
we have seen, though this is a false premise that comes back to punish them later, it still 
happens, and we need to do something about it. So the first domino to fall must be 
simple listening to the patient. Listening to them when they talk about the details of 
their experience of illness, and validating their experience of suffering, but also paying 
attention to the details they give about the rest of their life and seeing how their illness 
factors into that. Listening is the predecessor for caring. 
As we’ve seen, patients want physicians that will be receptive to what they have 
to say. The Wall Street Journal patient survey found that 84% of patients want a doctor 
who “Listens carefully to your health care concerns and questions” and who is “Is easy 




former appeal is explicit, and the latter is easily met if a physician is willing to let the 
patient interject without having to dominate the conversation. The fact that these were 
two of the very-most-wanted needs by patients speaks to the current absence of 
listening in medical practice. On one hand, the blame for this lies with the vendor-
relationship contemporary doctors have with their patients, but once again, we also run 
into a structural barrier here. 
Taking time to listen to one’s patient is at direct odds with the contemporary aim 
of health insurance corporations of producing the most efficient clinical response in the 
least amount of time. Some proponents of an empathetic approach to medicine would 
argue that this is a false dichotomy, and that listening actually saves time in the long 
run, as patients who are attended to properly have better health outcomes. This may or 
may not be true, but cannot base the principles for caring for our sick on efficient 
output. We choose listening not because it functions better mechanically, but because it 
better responds to the needs of the ill. We have seen the efficiency model of medicine 
close in on its goals in the last several decades, and all we have to show for it is 
ruptured relationships between patients and doctors. We must prioritize care over output 
if we are to have a medicine that allows doctors to fully attend to their patients, as 
patients desire. 
b. Empathy 
 Listening comes hand-in-hand with the potential for resonance. While the 
confident battle-tested doctor reassuring the insecure patient is a positive vision of the 
doctor-patient relation, we can ask for more. When the patient learns that the one behind 




then there is the basis for trust between the two. Then, the patient will be more willing 
to open up to their doctor. As we noted in the introduction, there is a consistent finding 
in the literature that patients want more empathetic doctors (Mercer et al., 2005). When 
doctors detach from their patients, empathy is the first thing to go. Here, we will define 
empathy as being able to put oneself in the shoes of another through imagination and 
relating one’s past experiences. 
Listening and empathy both play significant roles in the ethics of care, although 
they are part of a larger value of care itself, and there is a diversity of viewpoints when 
it comes to empathy in the ethics of care. Noddings valued a certain type of empathy 
present in the ethics of care called “engrossment,” which is caring about another so 
deeply that one accesses a window to their reality, experiencing their thoughts, hopes, 
and dreams (Noddings 1984, as cited in Slote 12). Modern critiques have expanded on 
Noddings’ work in important ways.. 
Noddings saw empathy as more of an emotional reflection than as the cognitive 
ability to put oneself in another’s shoes. Recently, however, ethics of care scholar 
Michael Slote has argued that there is actually more value in so-called ‘cognitive 
empathy’ in the practice of care than was previously thought. He argues that as we 
develop more advanced structures of empathy, we can not only feel the emotions that 
others are visibly feeling, but we can also,  
for example, feel an acute empathic sadness on seeing a person we know 
to have terminal cancer boisterously enjoy himself in seeming or in 
actual ignorance of his own fatal condition… We learn to empathize not 
just with what a person is actually feeling, but with what they will feel or 





This type of prognostic empathy is invaluable for physicians, as it allows them to 
deliver bad news in the most comforting way, or frame medical treatment plans in ways 
that will help the patient understand what their options are. 
Slote also discusses the principle of autonomy in his book, explaining that 
empathy is more closely related to autonomy than we might think. For Slote, the 
discussion of autonomy boils down to the respect component of the “respect for patient 
autonomy” principle. Slote argues that behind disregard for autonomy is a lack of 
respect for the other, and behind that lack of respect is a lack of empathy:  
One shows respect for someone if, and only if, one exhibits appropriate 
empathic concern for them in one’s dealings with them… It would 
appear that a morality of empathic caring requires one to respect other 
people’s autonomy and not just or simply to be concerned with their 
welfare. (Slote 57) 
Thus, Slote builds up a conception of autonomy from a kernel of empathy, of 
connection with another and understanding their needs and abilities, without attempting 
to constrain those abilities. This is a totally different way of approaching the notion of 
autonomy than the liberal formulation. Instead of starting from the outside, and viewing 
another as a sealed vessel of which autonomy is a barrier to entry, Slote says that we 
build genuine respect for autonomy from the bottom up; through coming to know 
another at a deep level and listening to them fully we are able to see what they truly 
want, respect those wants, and enable them to pursue them. “If it is wrong to treat 
people with disrespect, then… at the heart of that wrongdoing (or wronging) is a failure 
of empathy” (Slote 60). Slote’s empathic care therefore yields autonomy as a byproduct. 
If we can aim for this in doctor-patient relationships, then we solve several issues. We 
can not only achieve the patient autonomy that is so touted by current medical ethics, 




That being said, it is also important to recognize the emotional components of 
empathy. This is where researchers like Hojat et a. go astray. While their research into 
clinical empathy is valuable for showing what doctors are lacking, the solutions they 
offer up deify cognitive identity and segregate it from emotion. Their empathy is strictly 
differentiated from sympathy, which they define as an emotional attribute that involves 
feeling another’s pain or suffering. They align empathy and sympathy with a reason-
emotion dichotomy, and then only favor the former. This view negates the important 
component that emotion plays in care. 
Ethics of care scholars would be more careful with this binary. While Hojat et. 
al make a valuable contribution in pointing out the decline in empathy throughout 
medical school, we should be wary of dividing the functions of physicians too neatly 
into emotional, innate, inefficacious sympathy, and cognitive, mutable, productive 
empathy. Instead, physicians ought to recognize and embody both the emotional and 
intellectual sides of relating to another. In some cases, they will have the personal 
experiences to be able to share emotions with patients, while in other cases they will 
have to rely on their capabilities of imagining themselves in their patient’s shoes, or 
imagining how their patient might feel where an illness to play out a certain way. 
Empathy is particularly valuable for physicians as it lets them understand the 
significance of their healing work through the patient’s eyes. Healing is far more 
meaningful if doctors are able to connect the recovery to the patient being able to work 
towards their life-meaning. Learning about others’ projects — their meaning that gets 
them up in the mornings — and then having the opportunity to enable them to reach that 




empathizing with one’s patients. Thus, empathy can counteract the increased rates of 
burnouts seen in the medical profession in recent years. As Riess explains, there are two 
keys to preventing burnout: seeing one’s patients as individuals rather than sets of 
symptoms, and then seeing oneself as competent (Craiglow 2020). Empathetic care 
achieves both these objectives through allowing doctors to learn about the emotions of 
their particular patient, and through helping them recognize the profound power their 
work has for that patient. 
Empathy in medicine is a thinly-balanced act, though. Slote also helps us to 
draw boundaries between where it is appropriate to express empathy and where one is 
crossing a line, as we searched for earlier in the case study of the student doctor 
grieving for her patient’s illness. Slote says that the line is crossed when the one-caring 
is so engaged with the other that they fail to be able to differentiate and attend to the 
other’s needs: “someone who is overinvolved with another person may have difficulty 
in separating their own needs and desires from those of the other, and this may mean 
they fail to respond empathically to what the other needs or wants” (Slote 57). He gives 
the example of parents who are so invested in their childrens’ success that they stifle 
their childrens’ own vision of what success might look like to them in favor of the 
parents’ vision so that they can live vicariously through the child. In contrast, a healthy 
parenting style involves respecting one’s children and thus realizing that they might 
want different things for their lives than their parents do. While we must be cautious not 
to replicate paternalistic relational styles in our new ethics, we can recognize the value 
of empathy in the doctor-patient relationship to let another see what is best for 





 Only once a doctor has attentively listened to their patient — and understood on 
some cognitive and emotional level the experience their patient is going through — are 
they ready to make a decision about medical care. This is where the engaged aspect of 
care comes in. Physicians ought to take an active stand on the way to deal with the 
health matter confronting the patient. That might not seem like a bold claim, but as 
we’ve seen, modern physicians have begun to shy away from vouching for a particular 
path of medical treatment. However, because our physicians practicing engaged care 
already have skin in the game, this likely won’t be as much of a problem as it is for 
current physicians, who don’t go out of their way to learn about their patients. Many 
medical ethicists hear the sound of active advocacy of one of the means at the disposal 
of the physician, and automatically assume that that represents a return to paternalism. 
This does not have to be the case. Instead, there is a middle ground where doctors can 
advocate a certain treatment without enforcing it. In contrast to the days of paternalism, 
because we now have the useful protections of autonomy, physicians are able to stake 
out a claim about their clinical guidance for the patient, without making the patient 
follow that guidance if they don’t want to. 
 This active advocacy of a position through both knowledge and experience – or 
clinical judgement -- resolves some of the tension between patients wanting more 
guidance from their doctors that we observed in Sinding et al.’s study. Patients will no 
longer be put in the awkward place of having to semantically trick doctors into 
admitting what they would do if it was their own health at risk. Instead, doctors will be 




debate that plan or go with another. The default is the physician’s plan, though, so 
patients who are already overwhelmed by the experience of illness and suffering have a 
simple option for their medical care without having to come up with their own plan or 
prod one out of their doctor.  
 The most important tenet of achieving engaged care is two-way communication 
between the doctor and the patient. That is why the physician must set the groundwork 
of listening and understanding their patient’s situation before prescribing a treatment. At 
that point, this responsibility for the patient’s suffering will be a natural byproduct of 
learning about a patient’s life and actually coming to care for them and about what 
happens to them.  
 It is important that we do not regress to paternalism, so the ultimate say in 
responding to such decisions must be the patients. They cannot be forced or coerced 
into responding a particular way. One might argue that simply advocating for a line of 
treatment will put pressure on a patient to adopt that line, but this is in fact the entire 
point of the medical encounter. To encounter a patient, learn about their ailment, values, 
and potential treatments, then to suggest one to them. Patients come to doctors for 
guidance, not for detached concern. 
Of course, in some cases patients want to fully handle their illness on their own, 
and that’s fine. This is where attentive listening is key: patients will make clear the level 
of involvement that they want in their life. Some patients want full support and 
guidance from their physician, others have things under control and just want their 
physician there to prescribe medications and get on with their day. Relational styles 




when the patient wants them to. Right now, many patients’ appeals for guidance go 
unanswered in the name of “hands off the patient.”  
 
 Here, we have outlined three values to focus on to make the doctor-patient 
relationship more conducive to trust and more responsive to patients’ appeals. Putting 
this chapter together with the prior, we began to develop here a “voice of care” that 
could complement the “voice of justice” that is prevalent in medicine. As we move 






VII. Potential Shortcomings of an Ethics of Care in Medicine 
 In the previous chapters, we looked at caring ways that doctors can relate to 
their patients in an effort to supplement existing medical ethics. However, the process 
outlined is not infallible, and there are several criticisms that can be leveled at this 
model of care in this doctor-patient relationship. Thus, in this chapter we shall examine 
four potential drawbacks of the application of an ethics of care in medicine, and ways to 
overcome those obstacles. 
First, we will look at one of the more troubling findings we have come across, 
and the elephant in the room when dealing with any dimension of healthcare in the 
United States - the economics of medical insurance. As stated earlier, if patients don’t 
have access to health insurance whatsoever, there is no room to build a foundation for a 
caring patient-doctor relationship. Secondly, some feminists argue that doctors are still 
struggling to fully embrace patient autonomy, so it is premature to move past autonomy 
as a guiding principle of medical ethics. Feminist scholars such as Susan Sherwin argue 
that physicians have not yet demonstrated that they can treat patients without 
discrimination without the shield of autonomy corralling them to do so. Thirdly, we will 
examine an argument by some ethics of care scholars, particularly Eva Kittay, that 
doctors and other professionals aren’t actually engaging in dependency work. While 
they are “caring” for patients, Kittay argues that they do not adopt the same role as less 
statused jobs, such as nursing (Kittay 39). Finally, we will review one of the main 
defenses of existing medical ethics against more holistic ethical schools: the simplicity 
of principles. One of the main appeals of a deontological set of ethics is that it comes in 




years in intensive scientific and clinical education, providing an ethical code that 
doesn’t require much work or reflection is a tempting offer. 
a. Economics 
 So far, we have mainly focused on the individual in remedying the doctor-
patient relationship. This approach has its strengths, after all, care ethics is defined by 
its focus on the particular relationships in one’s life. With this focus, we can best give 
advice to individual doctors on how they ought to relate to particular patients they are 
actually practicing medicine on. However, by focusing on the individual, there is 
necessarily less light shone on the structures behind why doctor-patient relationships are 
so poor, namely, the health insurance structures providing healthcare to some but 
certainly not adequate care to all.  
Throughout the preceding chapters we have seen the manifold ways through 
which a lack of reasonable healthcare strains doctor-patient relationships. In 3d, we saw 
that physicians are being pigeonholed into more and more “professional” roles by their 
contracts, so that they come to be less healer and more provider of services, with their 
patients as customers. In 3e, we found that insurance networks are often forced to 
overpromise services in order to make themselves competitive, and then physicians take 
the fall when they are not able to deliver these services to patients. A model of 
physician as provider of a good also neatly aligns with the autonomy-based medical 
principlism that we’ve identified as a barrier to good medical care. Thus, in chapter 
four, we saw that the mechanism through which physicians build up resistance to 
connecting with patients starts with overbearing economic pressures. Pressures on the 




workloads during their training, and in response to these workloads the students often 
shut down and stop responding to their patients desire for emotional connection. 
Clearly, economic factors explain a large part of why it is so hard for doctors to build 
relationships with their patients. Furthermore, it is more important that we get medical 
treatment to patients in the first place than that that treatment is guided by the principles 
of care. 
With all that said, this paper still focuses on relationships between individuals. 
The reasoning for not focusing on such economic factors is that while they are 
extremely important, they have already been studied in depth, and in recent years have 
been brought into the public eye for critical examination. The push for a single-payer 
healthcare system in the United States such as Medicare for All is increasingly popular 
(Jones 2020). Bringing more care into medicine, on the other hand, has not been 
brought to the limelight in anywhere near the same capacity, despite the fact that 
patients overwhelmingly want a turn to a more compassionate style of care from their 
doctors (Bright for the Wall Street Journal 2004, Mercer et al. 2005).  
Thus, while care might be a secondary goal overall to reforming the economics 
of healthcare in the United States, it is also an important objective in its own right. We 
have examined several perspectives for balancing personal and structural changes to 
enable care in medicine - one being that simply reforming health insurance overnight 
would not resolve the entrenched patterns of lack of care among physicians for their 
patients. A more mature perspective, though, dictates that reforms in health insurance 
will work symbiotically with a turn to more caring doctor-patient relationships. 




with the material resources to care for their patients, and prioritizing a perspective of 
care is a valuable precursor to achieving reforms in healthcare; in many ways it is a lack 
of compassion in favor of profit-seeking that has landed us in this messy medical-
insurance situation in the first place. The original work here relies on connecting the 
dots between these economic factors that affect medicine at large and the manner of 
practice of individual doctors with their patients.  
b. Sexism in Medicine 
 A point that we have argued, alongside those such as Tauber (Tauber 2005, 59-
60) and Qualtere-Burcher (Qualtere-Burcher 2011, 51), is that medical ethics put too 
much weight on autonomy. Our medical ethics cannot just be a defense against the 
specter of paternalism. Yet one point that some feminists make in response to this claim 
is that paternalism is alive and well — particularly when it comes to doctors treating 
female patients — and we still need safeguards such as explicit protection of autonomy 
at every turn of the road. One of the foremost authors who espouses this view is Susan 
Sherwin. Sherwin agrees with some humanistic critiques of modern medicine, such as 
that it has too much of an emphasis on science. She claims that an effect of the role of 
physician-as-scientist is that doctors no longer taking their patients as “complex, 
integrated human beings,” (Sherwin 1992, 145-48) which we have certainly found 
ground for throughout this paper. However, she also argues that the alternative to this 
model, of doctors treating medicine as more of an art, just means that those doctors will 
be exerting personal authority over their patients instead of institutional authority. 
Either way, doctors are susceptible to the urge to control their patients. The problem in 




much. To this end, Sherwin actually warns against patients having too much trust in 
their physicians, because it opens the door for manipulation (Sherwin 1992, 155). 
Sherwin says that doctors should yield to their patients’ (autonomous) decisions, only 
offering information rather than judgement. 
Sherwin’s critique of care within medicine speaks to a larger discourse within 
feminist ethics about whether care can be salvaged from discrimination against women 
or must be done away with. Kathryn Norlock says of this discourse: “[these] criticisms 
tend to proceed from a view that it is problematic that an ethic of care is predicated on 
seeing femininity as valuable” (Norlock 2019). Some critics of the ethics of care have 
accused it of glorifying the gender roles feminists have been fighting so hard to free 
themselves from6. Others have worried that it opens up caregivers to exploitation7, and 
that it can become an insular ethics if care is only relegated to those with whom one has 
connections as forged on certain material and political realities8. These criticisms hinge 
on the notion of whether or not we ought to see femininity as valuable; they suggest that 
we might want to doubt the value of femininity (Norlock 2019). The ultimate question, 
then, is whether the very construct of feminine ethics is oppressive by nature, or if it can 
stand on its own two feet as an authentic contributor to ethical discussion that corrects 
or overrides the faults of ethics of justice. 
There is also anecdotal and empirical gravity behind Sherwin’s concerns, as 
pointed to in Dusenbury’s account of medical gaslighting referenced earlier. In this 
paper, we call for more responsibility on the part of physicians. However, this work 
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raises the question of whether doctors are really ready to handle the responsibility of 
providing good care without discrimination. 
How do we resolve this tension between calling for more caring responsibility 
on the part of the physician and fighting sexism within medicine? Qualtere-Burcher 
gives a somewhat convincing answer. In reviewing Sherwin’s claims, he agrees with 
her that physicians have often disregarded patients’ concerns, but he thinks the blame 
for this lies with simple time and financial constraints, less nefarious than a thirst for 
dominance that Sherwin attributes to them (Qualtere-Burcher 2008, 23). I agree with 
Qualtere-Burcher in this sentiment.  
However, Qualtere-Burcher goes on to make a more polarizing claim when 
allocating the blame for discrimination within medicine. Rather than faulting their 
individual interaction style, as Sherwin does, he blames their lack of support for 
institutional reform to fight sexism and other reforms within medicine:  
Physicians have been slow to take up progressive causes such as 
universal health care, because they fear the impact of such reforms on 
their income and status. If physicians are to regain some modicum of 
trust from critics such as Sherwin, they will need to be more politically 
progresswive and truly champion the causes of the oppressed and 
underserved, whether this arises from gender, race or class. Physicians 
will not regain trust at an individual level; it must be as a profession. 
(Qualtere-Burcher 23, 2008) 
Institutional reform is certainly important; as we discussed in the last section, an 
increase in a caring style of medical practice fits right alongside a change in the 
systemic barriers to health care. What’s more, doctors have significant political leverage 
and could be the ones to move the needle on these types of issues. However, this is far 
from a perfect resolution. It seems too neat of a solution to simply divide up the 




of care while placing the blame for discrimination on institutions. It feels too much as 
though we are letting doctors off the hook so long as they pay lip service to certain 
political causes.  
Ultimately, the best defense of integrating an ethics of care into medicine may 
simply be the demand and necessity for care as central to the therapeutic relationship 
between doctor and patient, and the inaccuracy of full autonomy for describing our life-
situations. If we are going to embrace this aspect of feminist ethics within medicine, 
however, it is disingenuous to turn a blind eye to the discrimination that goes on within 
medicine towards women. We cannot have feminine ethics without feminist ethics as 
well. Doctors who take up the mantle of care must also take up the mantle of anti-
discrimination alongside it, not just through their calls for political reform but also 
through their own individual lives and practices. Doctors must actively engage with 
liberatory movements, and particularly become aware of the historical and continued 
discrimination against women and people of color in medicine -- for example, in 
research and in the problem of gaslighting patients who do not present with readily-
diagnosable symptoms -- so as to avoid these faults. 
c. Caring Isn’t the Doctor’s Job 
One challenge that has been posed to the inclusion of doctors into an ethics of 
care is that their social status privileges them in ways that traditional care workers do 
not benefit from. Thus, the ethics of care categorically cannot be applied to their 
situation. Because of this view, care has been more typically associated with nursing 
than with medicine. Furthermore, nurses’ work is neither remunerated monetarily nor 




mirrors much of the work that care ethicists speak about, including the unpaid labor of 
parenting. 
Some care ethicists, like Eva Kittay, argue that only nurses and other similarly-
devalued workers such as childcare workers ought to be included in her category of 
“dependency work.” She explicitly disavows the idea of physicians and other 
professionals being considered as doing dependency work: “The patient’s well-being, 
even her life, is dependent on her physician…  Still, these professional services are not 
dependency work, even in the extended sense” (Kittay 38). While doctors do put the 
well-being of another as a priority, unlike most care workers, they accrue significant 
societal benefits from this sacrifice: “The potential self-effacement of the other-directed 
character of professional work is offset by the autonomy, detachment, and achievement 
accorded to the professional” (Kittay 39). For Kittay, dependency work is associated 
with a low status in society while medicine is not. Thus, it seems we are at an impasse. 
This is how care has historically played out in medicine, neatly broken down 
with nursing being characterized as the ‘caring’ side of healing and medicine as the 
‘curing’ side. Such a binary is reflected in the often gender-coded job roles and manners 
of interaction of doctors, nurses, and other health professions. One can easily imagine 
the brisk, business-like doctor meeting with a patient to “tell it to them straight” about 
their condition, followed up by the gentler, caring nurse to tend to the emotions of the 
patient. As gender stigma breaks down, however, with men making inroads to nursing 
(Egan 2021) and women to medicine -- women composed a majority of medical 
students for the first time in 2019 (Boyle 2019) -- we need to transcend such binaries. 




the medical conditions of their patients, and a lot on their plate, there is no reason for 
the caring side of illness to be relegated entirely to other health professions. Doctors can 
take up the orientation of care, as they are the touchpoint for determining decisions with 
patients. And expanding the ethics of care to doctors is ultimately in the best interest of 
their patients as well. 
d. Simplicity 
A large part of the defense of existing medical ethics hinges on the simplicity 
with which doctors can learn and remember them, in order to apply to their medical 
practice. And as we learned when reviewing the history of medicine, patient autonomy 
is vastly superior to the alternative of physician paternalism. The ideal of autonomy and 
like principles have several benefits in that they are simply rules that doctors can easily 
remember and put into practice in their clinic. If our work is to stick, we must translate 
some of these more intricate ethical analyses into similarly easily digestible and 
actionable steps. That is the strength of principlism, and hopefully we can work off that 
strength to translate some of the insights gleaned here to new principles. This is largely 
why this project focuses on just a few values9, and ones that physicians already practice 
to some degree. By making these values explicit and prioritizing them alongside the 
existing principles of medical ethics, the clinical encounter can be strengthened and the 
doctor-patient relationship can reach its true potential.  
As we engage in this new ethical project, we keep Beauchamp and Childress’ 
principles of Autonomy, Beneficence, Non-maleficence, and Respect for persons close 
                                                        





at hand. These principles serve as appropriate limitations and barriers that the physician 
must not cross. Beneficence in particular is representative of the engaged, caring 
approach we’ve outlined here. So in many ways, we are only advocating for a more 
balanced application of these principles, instead of one focused primarily on the 
principle of respect for autonomy. 
 Furthermore, in this mosaic of existing medical rules and novel medical values 
that we are constructing, there is more cohesion than might be expected. For example, 
responding to patients’ demands is a more accurate reflection of respect for patient 
autonomy than is leaving them isolated to deal with the clinical encounter and decision-
making process alone. If patients are asking for more engaged listening from their 
physicians, it is only appropriate by the logic of respect for patient autonomy that those 
physicians answer the appeals of their patients. Fundamentally, there is a false 
dichotomy between Beauchamp and Childress’ principles of respect for patient 
autonomy and beneficence. Patient autonomy, when properly exercised instead of in a 
flattened and prescribed manner, involves doctors sharing their knowledge and 
guidance with their patients. Clearly, patients want what is best for them, which is why 
they come to doctors in the first place, rather than toughing out their illness on their 
own where they’d have perfect autonomy. Through this project we have come to 
establish a more mature version of autonomy, that is enabled through respect and trust 
rather than being a surface-level defense mechanism. 
There are certainly still criticisms to be made of this project, but we have 
integrated several of the main points here. Economic factors, while an important 




it is true that medicine has been responsible for much discrimination amongst 
marginalized groups, the ethics of care presents such value to the doctor-patient 
relationship that medical ethics would be remiss not to integrate it to some degree, even 
by a profession that would not be traditionally considered as engaging in caring labor 
such as doctors. As far as simplicity goes, we have found some success in translating 
the ethics of care into simple values. However, it is also important to remember that one 
of the very strengths of care ethics is that it does not attempt to reduce human relations 
to something they are not, and therefore it may well have more complexity than simple 







In this project, we set out to determine how doctors can best relate to their 
patients, with the help of the school of the ethics of care. We’ve learned a lot along the 
way, and here we will take a little time to dissect those findings. Most importantly, we 
entered this project with a hypothesis that the ethics of care would benefit the doctor-
patient relationship, and that has largely proved true. Furthermore, we learned through 
doing this project that the ethics of care is particularly tailored to the shortcomings of 
that relationship. Through combining the ethics of care with existing medical ethics, we 
can achieve a new set of more comprehensive medical ethics. This new ethics would 
not only teach doctors how to protect their patients, but also positive interaction styles, 
and wouldn’t give them an easy way out of figuring out the patient’s problems and how 
those interact with the rest of their life. 
One of the most important lessons learned is that the economics of healthcare 
and the personal relationship between individual doctors and their patients are 
inextricably linked. In the beginning of this project, it was unclear whether to focus 
more on the individual relationships held between doctors and their patients or the 
relationship between medicine and the public at large. Both approaches were present in 
the literature, but ultimately the vast majority of this piece centered on that of individual 
patient-doctor relationships. We had to sacrifice that larger lens of analysis in order to 
focus the project. We did, at times, however, talk about the public trust or opinion (and 
lack thereof) in the medical profession and doctors as a whole. 
Looking at the systematic factors involved in medical training did show not to 




this project yielded - there is a surprisingly direct connection between the personal 
interaction style within a doctor and their patient and the economic factors of medicine 
at large. Much research has examined the lack of health insurance in America and its 
repercussions for those in poverty, as well as marginalized groups. There has been a 
little work in more humanistic medical ethics. But a unique motif that we saw 
throughout this project was the link between the two: doctors train and work under 
intense pressure to go through more patients in less and less time, which is an intrinsic 
barrier to being able to care for all of their patients. Once again, the connection between 
justice and care arises. 
This leads to this project’s important implications for physician burnout, an 
unexpected finding. One would assume that most of the benefits of a caring doctor 
would accrue on the side of the patient. However, as is typical of an ethical school such 
as the ethics of care that emphasizes gestalt over individuals, this new style of ethics 
actually ends up benefiting both parties. It clearly meets the demands of patients, as 
seen from multiple empirical measures that patients want a more engaged and 
thoughtful style from their doctors and their relationships. It also meets the needs of 
burnt-out doctors, though. At first, this may seem counter-intuitive, as the last thing that 
doctors who are already burnt-out in their practice would want to do is spend even more 
time in that practice. However, we can come to characterize burn-out and other similar 
disaffections with a lack of empathy rather than an overabundance of empathy. A doctor 
burns out when they stop caring, not when they care too much. Thus, the ethics of care 




Granted, this is a band aid solution. In the long term, the health system must be 
reformed to be able to relieve physicians from these pressures in the first place. 
We were unable to fully reconcile feminist and “feminine” ethics in medicine. 
Future work could help to delineate the differences between these two domains of 
feminist philosophy more, and see how they might integrate into medical practice. 
There is a fundamental tension when attempting to put into place the ethics of care in a 
profession that historically and currently continues to discriminate against women, as 
though doctors haven’t earned the trust to be able to exercise caring medicine, that they 
must first demonstrate that they can practice medicine without discrimination. 
There is also the hard project of putting this research into practice. Medicine is 
currently dominated by a single school and set of principles of medical ethics. Only the 
medical ethicists themselves are the ones who know the diversity of thought in the field. 
Doctors are merely taught one set of rules to follow. This is unhealthy because a 
diversity of ethical views is necessary in such an important venture as medicine. For 
that reason, future doctors and medical ethicists must collaborate to bring more 
viewpoints to the table. Clearly, a primary way through which care ethics will achieve 
popularity and widespread application in medicine is through education. Many medical 
students are taught entire classes based around Beauchamp and Childress’ ethical 
principles, and there’s no reason that they couldn’t have a similar type of education 
about the ethics of care. Yet there is the tension of prescribing something as intricate 
and case-dependent as the ethics of care on an institutional level, a fear that the nuance 




can help to explore such educational avenues in medicine without routinizing it as 
merely another check-box on the clinical checklist. 
Finally, there is autonomy to deal with. Medical ethics cannot just be defensive 
against wrong-doing, it must also have a positive dimension of doing good by the 
patient. The ethics of care can provide this in spades, as it is all about taking on 
responsibility rather than doing the bare minimum. In truth, that is the core of medicine. 
Doctors should not be able to get by in medical practice just by giving their patients 
treatment options, they ought to take an active stake in their patients’ care and advocate 
particular treatments. This will ultimately strengthen the bond between doctors and 
patients, both on the level of individuals and in society at large. If patients know that 
doctors are there not just to apply scientific knowledge as a researcher might, but also to 
care for them as a person, as a healer, then that can begin to remediate the many wrongs 
done by medicine throughout its history. 
This project comes at a time when the public eye has shifted to the medical 
community, for good and bad reasons. For one, doctors, nurses, and the like have risen 
to the occasion to fight the coronavirus pandemic. In doing so, they have demonstrated 
the responsibility advocated here - acting selflessly in a time when the country was in 
desperate need of care. However, there is also increased scrutiny on the medical 
community, as vast health disparities between black and white Americans are brought 
to light and exacerbated during the pandemic. Many hospitals and medical professionals 
have sworn to do better in the light of these realities, but it remains to be seen how 
seriously they will take these commitments. Furthermore, an initial mistrust of the 




has repeatedly exploited these groups, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis study. The doctor-
patient relationship between society at large and the medical community is coming to 
terms with its past. Thus, this moment serves both as a chance to reflect on what 
responsibility and care can look like in the best of cases, but also a chance for sustained 
reflection on what we can do better. 
What’s left to do to apply the ethics of care to the practice of medicine? In truth, 
we have only begun to outline how a doctor-patient relationship might look when 
guided under the ethics of care. That’s a good thing, though. The ethics of care is 
characterized by its flexibility to circumstance, not being codified. Therefore, if there is 
only one image offered here, then it is because there is no overbearing, top-down 
mandate of how care ought to be. Besides, many of the doctors we have referenced here 
— Paul Qualtere-Burcher, Alfred Tauber, Rita Charon, William Branch — are 
practicing or have practiced medicine in their own right, and much of the work of 
discovering how best to care for another comes about through practice, rather than 
writing about it. That’s why I’m excited to put these ideas into work in my own career 
in medicine. Combining practice and theory, weaving a thread of responsibility that 
grounds the patient with the certainty of science-based medicine yet lets them know 
there is also a person on the other side of the table, that is the essence of the project that 
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